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SNAKE OIL SPEECH
Jane R. Bambauer*
Abstract: Snake oil is dangerous only by way of the claims that are made about its healing
powers. It is a speech problem, and its remedy involves speech restrictions. But First
Amendment doctrine has struggled to find equilibrium in the balance between free speech and
the reduction of junk science. Regulation requires the government to take an authoritative
position about which factual claims are “true” and “false,” which is anathema to open inquiry.
As a result, free speech jurisprudence overprotects factual claims made in public discourse out
of respect for any remote possibility that the scientific consensus might be wrong but has given
wide latitude to state actors to regulate all but the most accepted and well supported claims in
advertising. This Article shows that the interests in speech and safety alike would be better
served by switching from the truth-oriented set of rules that apply today to a risk orientation.
While risk and falsity are obviously related, they are not substitutes. The transition to a risk
analysis would better match longstanding First Amendment traditions that permit state interests
in avoiding harm to outweigh speech interests while maintaining epistemic modesty. The
practical effect of this shift would be to permit more regulation in public discourse and less in
commercial speech.
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Figure 1:
The Great Yaquis Snake Oil promotional design1

INTRODUCTION
Snake oil is dangerous not because of what it is, but because of what is
said about it. The metaphor is used for a wide range of pseudoscientific

1. Chip Hines, The Medicine Show Syndrome—Are We Guilty?, ON PASTURE (Jan. 13, 2014),
https://onpasture.com/2014/01/13/the-medicine-show-syndrome-are-we-guilty/
[https://perma.cc/
UD6T-PEBJ].
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claims about products, services, lifestyles, and even socio-political
theories.2 Snake oil, in other words, is speech.3
It is not surprising, then, that the government has an interest in
regulating factual claims to avoid the propagation of junk science, and the
First Amendment sometimes permits it to do so. For commercial speakers,
truth is a prerequisite for any First Amendment coverage at all. By
contrast, the popular press is often insulated from any government
assessment of falsity. For all speakers, the First Amendment rules are
organized around theories of truth.4
These free speech traditions are not sustainable. One major source of
incoherence is a failure in both law and the scholarly literature to
differentiate two sorts of factual claims that are importantly distinct:
accepted knowledge and contested knowledge.5
2. See generally DAN HURLEY, NATURAL CAUSES: DEATH, LIES, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA’S
VITAMIN AND HERBAL SUPPLEMENT INDUSTRY (2006) (products) (using snake oil as an example and
a metaphor for the herbal supplement industry); Snake Oil for the 21st Century: Health Claims that
Are Too Good to Be True, CONSUMER REPS. (2013), https://www.consumerreports.org/
cro/magazine/2013/11/health-claims-too-good-to-be-true/index.htm [https://perma.cc/HMY6-AP4J]
(range of products); C. E. Evans, Letter, Modern Snake Oil, 24 CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN 644, 644
(1978) (education services); Kristen Houghton, A Snake Oil Salesman Alive and Well in Dr. Oz,
HUFFPOST (June 30, 2014, 5:19 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kristen-houghton/snakeoilsalesman-alive-a_b_5537666.html [https://perma.cc/Y8XJ-SGPF] (lifestyle); Dani Rodrik,
Economics: Science, Craft, or Snake Oil?, INST. FOR ADVANCED STUDY: INST. LETTER, Fall 2013, at
1, 14–15, https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/IL_FALL2013_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3X73-UUDB] (political theory); Amie Parnes, President Obama Slams Romney,
Ryan Tax Plans as ‘Trickle-Down Snake Oil,’ HILL (Aug. 15, 2012, 7:23 PM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/243857-obama-slams-romney-ryan-tax-plans-as-trickledown-snake-oil [https://perma.cc/T8P8-68KK] (political theory).
3. See Jim Edwards, Lesson from Pfizer: Don’t Describe Your Product as “Snake Oil” in Internal
Email, CBS MONEYWATCH (Mar. 26, 2010, 12:05 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lessonfrom-pfizer-dont-describe-your-product-as-snake-oil-in-internal-email/ [https://perma.cc/P456-HU
V4].
4. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). This Article
therefore disagrees with Fred Schauer’s assessment that “surprisingly little of the free speech tradition
is addressed directly to the question of the relationship between a regime of freedom of speech and
the goal of increasing public knowledge of facts or decreasing public belief in false factual
propositions.” Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 902 (2010)
[hereinafter Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment].
5. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV.
445, 467–70 (2012) (carefully laying out the unsettled epistemological role of the First Amendment
but treating all statement of facts as a single category). The closest might be Justice Breyer’s
distinction between “easily verifiable facts” and “false statements about philosophy, religion, history,
the social sciences, the arts, and the like.” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731 (2012) (Breyer,
J., concurring). Helen Norton adopts Justice Breyer’s distinction in arguing that falsehoods about
“objectively verifiable facts” should receive lighter constitutional scrutiny. Helen Norton, Lies and
the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 200–01 [hereinafter Norton, Lies and the Constitution].
But some scholars claim that scientific speech is in fact the easiest speech to evaluate. See, e.g.,
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 30–33 (1982); Christopher P.
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Accepted knowledge, whether it pertains to highly specific facts that
rely on instruments of measurement (like the temperature of a room) or to
more general claims like Einstein’s theory of relativity, can be verified
using a high standard of evidence. These claims are verifiable and valid
to the relevant community of experts. Although accepted knowledge is
fallible, little is lost and much is gained when the law treats these claims
as “true” (and their opposites as “false”).
Contested knowledge, by contrast, is known to be presently
unverifiable and subject to debate and speculation by the relevant expert
community.6 A contested claim will assert a hypothesis that may be
substantiated by empirical evidence, but not enough to have itself
accepted as irrefutable. The accumulation of evidence around some
general claims that have become accepted knowledge, like Einstein’s
theory of relativity or the theory of global warming, tends to obscure the
fact that most of the scientific claims that are relevant to consumers and
voters are tentative and have an insufficient base of evidence to deem
them either true or false.
First Amendment doctrine has fastidiously denied the importance of
contested factual claims. We see the consequences of this oversight by
observing the effects on First Amendment case law as a whole. A
true/false dichotomy that fails to account for contested claims is bound to
be incoherent and pretentious. Low standards for “truth” will hamstring
government efforts to support public safety, but high standards screen out
most of the available information.7 Free speech law has not wrestled with
the problems of a falsity approach to junk science. Instead, the First
Amendment jealously guards public discourse against nearly all
government intrusion no matter how noxious the claims, but permits the
Guzelian, True and False Speech, 51 B.C. L. REV. 669, 696–700 (2010). But note that in later work,
Schauer uses a seemingly narrower category of “demonstrable facts.” Schauer, Facts and the First
Amendment, supra note 4.
6. This is sometimes referred to as “scientific speech” in First Amendment cases. E.g., United
States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2010 WL 2985257, at *15 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2010); cf.
Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1949) (discussing speech about “medical practices in fields
where knowledge has not yet been crystallized in the crucible of experience”). Scientific speech has
not been recognized as a speech category with unique properties and protections. “To ask what
constitutional constraints should apply to government regulations of ‘scientific speech’ presupposes
that there is something called ‘scientific speech’ that merits distinctive constitutional treatment. There
is no such discrete constitutional category of ‘scientific speech.’” Robert Post, Constitutional
Restraints on the Regulations of Scientific Speech and Scientific Research: Commentary on
“Democracy, Individual Rights and the Regulation of Science,” 15 SCI. ENGINEERING ETHICS 431,
431 (2009).
7. See David Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334,
366 (1991) (“If the category of false statements of fact is not defined very narrowly, it can, of course,
become highly problematic.”).
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government to define scientific truth however it likes for commercial and
professional speakers. The result is a hodgepodge of constitutional rules
explained (but not entirely justified) by speaker type.8
But the quiet chaos of the falsity doctrine has started to break out into
noisy protests, both from corporate and commercial speakers and from
public outcry against “fake news.”9 Moreover, as courts have come to
appreciate the uncertainty in scientific discovery, they are increasingly
skeptical of truth as an organizing principle for factual claims because it
invites the government to settle live debates, to deny ambiguities in the
evidence, and to foster public confidence where it may not be warranted.10
And it is a recipe for embarrassment and perceived hypocrisy when the
government must retract previous truths.
The history of the lowly egg provides one example. For much of
American history, eggs were regarded as a wholesome food staple. But
their good standing withered in the 1960s when cholesterol was linked to
cardiovascular disease. To counteract plummeting demand, the egg
industry launched a campaign claiming that there was “no competent and
reliable scientific evidence that eating eggs, even in quantity, increases
the risk of heart attacks” and that competent studies suggested the
opposite—that “avoiding dietary cholesterol, including that in eggs,
increases the risk of heart disease.”11
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) disagreed. It alleged that the egg
industry violated the unfair and deceptive practices clause of the FTC Act
because “[i]n truth and in fact, . . . [t]here is competent and reliable
scientific evidence that eating eggs does increase the risk of heart
attacks.”12 The Seventh Circuit partially ratified the Commission’s
findings,13 and ads like this were permanently enjoined:
8. See infra Part II for a full account.
9. See Mark Verstraete, Derek E. Bambauer & Jane R. Bambauer, Identifying and Countering Fake
News, 2 ARIZ. L.J. EMERGING TECHS. (forthcoming 2018), https://law.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/
asset/document/fakenewsfinal_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ WV2H-93ZR]; Niraj Chokshi, How to Fight
‘Fake News’ (Warning: It Isn’t Easy), N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/09/18/business/media/fight-fake-news.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3V3S-XXS6].
10. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 752 (“[I]t is perilous to permit the state to be the arbiter of truth.”).
Before the Roberts Court, First Amendment precedent more or less permitted the government to retain
the power to determine whether specific statements are true or false. See Mark Tushnet, “Telling Me
Lies”: The Constitutionality of Regulating False Statements of Fact 22 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-02, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1737930 [https://perma.cc/CC79-7DL6]. But this, too, is changing. See
the discussion of the POM Wonderful case in infra section II.E.
11. In re Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 95–96 (1976), enforced in part, Nat’l
Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
12. Id.
13. Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d at 159.
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Figure 2:
National Commission on Egg Nutrition Advertisement14

At the time, the FTC’s position reflected a widely shared understanding
in the public health community. The majority of published health studies

14. In re Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. at 91.
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and the conclusions drawn from them by health experts conflicted with
the claims made in the egg industry ads.15 Worse still, the egg industry’s
ads seemed to serve the interests of the egg industry at the expense of the
consumer’s health. This was an easy case of deception.
The trouble is, self-interested as they were, the egg industry’s claims
now appear to be more correct than the FTC’s. The FTC had been relying
on an assumption (which it called a “fact” in its briefing) that high
cholesterol foods cause high levels of cholesterol in the bloodstream.16
The ads challenged this assumption, pointing out that the link was an
extrapolation with little supporting evidence. Indeed, the link between
dietary and blood stream cholesterol has been fairly well falsified in the
intervening decades.17 Health experts and the FTC had been thrown off
by a few poorly designed observational studies finding an association
between eggs and cardiovascular disease without controlling for
confounding factors like smoking, poor physical fitness, and the
consumption of red meats (which egg-eaters seem to have a greater
propensity to do).18 Subsequent studies failed to produce any causal
relationship between eating high-cholesterol foods and having high
cholesterol, and many organizations including the American Heart
Association, the Harvard School of Public Health, and the 2015 U.S.
Dietary Guidelines are now reviving the egg’s bedraggled reputation.19
It may be tempting to brush off this example as unrepresentative of the
typical problems caused by unsubstantiated advertising. Perhaps, some
would argue, selenium is a more apt example. Selenium is a supplement
that had been promoted for treating prostate cancer based on early clinical
15. Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d at 160–61.
16. See In re Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. at 95.
17. The majority of studies with reliable data have found no association between egg consumption
and risks of heart attack or stroke. See Ying Rong et al., Egg Consumption and Risk of Coronary
Heart Disease and Stroke: Dose-Response Meta-Analysis of Prospective Cohort Studies, BMJ, Jan.
7, 2013, at 5. Note that many studies found that the consumption of eggs appears to have an adverse
effect on some subpopulations of Americans with health problems, including diabetics. Id. Also, the
authors used the Begg & Egger regression test to check for publication bias. Id. at 3. They reported
this fact without comment, but the delightful serendipity of these names was too great for me to do
the same.
18. Id. at 4 (citing Frank B. Hu et al., A Prospective Study of Egg Consumption and Risk of
Cardiovascular Disease in Men and Women, 281 JAMA 1387 (1999)); see also Larry Husten, Stop
Trashing Eggs: Large Study Finds No Harm, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2013, 12:41 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/larryhusten/2013/01/15/large-meta-analysis-finds-no-harmassociated-with-eggs/#17d890ab307d [https://perma.cc/Z4RG-VYJA].
19. Eggs, HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. PUB. HEALTH, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/
eggs/ [https://perma.cc/CUS2-Q5P2]; Ben Tinker, Cholesterol in Food Not a Concern, New Report
Says, CNN (Feb. 19, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/19/health/dietary-guidelines/
index.html [https://perma.cc/7E5S-8X4N].
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results even after later, more robust evidence suggested that selenium not
only fails to reduce cancer patients’ risk of death but actually increases
it.20 For every egg case, there may be several selenium cases. Wouldn’t it
be better to let consumer protection and public health agencies punish the
occasional, coincidental truth than to permit companies to pollute the
consumer information environment?
This is, in a nutshell, the position taken by the majority of legal scholars
who have written on the issue.21 But the argument overlooks real problems
in the specific case of eggs and the general case of a truth-centered speech
doctrine. The problems, briefly, are the following: (1) government
standards for falsity do not reliably sort good and bad information; and (2)
in any case, falsity is a poor proxy for harm.
First, the problems with sorting good and bad factual information.
Scientific debates have a volatile relationship with factual truth where the
evidentiary record is thin or mixed (which is to say, most of the time). In
areas with contested knowledge—and nutrition and health is dominated
by them—weakly supported factual claims are as good as it gets. And
weakly supported factual claims are often better for consumers than the
alternative messages that will be used in advertising. They induce
curiosity and salience, and spur attempts by competitors and other
organizations to falsify the claims. Statements running against a robust
record of evidence (contradicting accepted knowledge) can safely be
20. Pam Harrison, More Evidence of Harm from Selenium in Prostate Cancer, MEDSCAPE (Jan. 8,
2015), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/837761 [perma.cc/6T5S-83WW].
21. See Susan Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2343, 2344–45
(making a similar institutional competence argument in the context of regulating internet service
providers); Stephanie M. Greene & Lars Noah, Debate, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the First
Amendment, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 239, 255–56 (2014); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M.
Mello, Prospects for Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion in an Era of Expanding Commercial
Speech Protection, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1539, 1585–89 (2014); Chris Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be
Presumed, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 551 (2014) (“One might see the FDCA regime as a reasonable
compromise between the competing needs for FDA to regulate the safety and efficacy of drugs at the
threshold when they come onto the market, while also allowing physicians and their patients a
measure of discretion to try drugs for new indications that are not yet proven effective.”). Rebecca
Tushnet has gone further still, arguing that fact-finders of every sort (federal agencies, juries, state
legislatures) should be able to decide which statements are false because although they “make
mistakes about what is false, those costs are similar to the harms of other mistaken economic policies.
We are better off overall in a system that regulates false and misleading commercial speech without
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.” Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of
“False” Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227,
229 (2007) [hereinafter Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is]. But see Jennifer L.
Herbst, Off-Label ‘Promotion’ May Not Be Merely Commercial Speech, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 43, 48
(2015); Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1203, 1204–06 (2008) (arguing that all falsehoods spoken with sincere belief should be
protected).
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treated as false facts by the government without doing great damage to
open inquiry,22 but regulators penalize and ban contested knowledge
without sufficient appreciation for the consequences to the information
ecosystem.
The egg case illustrates the problem. The pro-egg advertisements may
have contradicted the popular advice of the American Heart Association
and other public health groups, but the egg industry correctly described
the state of the cholesterol debate: there was not much evidence against
the egg (nor for it, for that matter), and no expert consensus had formed.23
When the state of evidence on an issue is in disarray, allowing the fight to
spill into the advertising arena can promote evidence-based consumer
decisions. At the very least, the freedom of debate has the virtue of
creating salience and demand for more research.
The second set of problems concern harm. Regulators who target
pseudoscientific claims use falsity (or lack of substantiation) as a proxy
for risk. But under conditions of uncertainty, the probability that a
statement is false is only part of the risk analysis. It also requires
regulators to compare the likely consequences if the statement is false to
the consequences of censorship if it later proves to be true.24 This cannot
be estimated with precision, but an attempt must be made.25 Without
constitutional bumpers, regulators tend to look myopically at only the
chance of falsity and ignore the comparative risks of screening out truth
versus failing to screen out falsity.26 These risks are often asymmetric.
Again, the egg case is instructive. The FTC was understandably
nervous about letting the egg industry coax consumers back into
purchasing more eggs when public health experts feared they could
increase the risk of heart attack, but it spent no energy considering the
health risks that could result from dissuading egg purchases. If it had tried
to learn a little about the consumption patterns of egg-eaters, the FTC may
have anticipated that the marginal consumer who is turned off from a

22. Although this alone will not necessarily justify regulation. See discussion infra Part I.
23. Indeed, scientific texts on heart disease from the 1970s acknowledged that “the relationship of
diet to prevention is not yet proven.” See Wm. Alex McIntosh, The Symbolization of Eggs in American
Culture: A Sociologic Analysis, 19 J. AM. C. NUTRITION 532S, 536S tbl.3 (2013) (quoting O.E. BYRD
& T.R. BYRD, MEDICAL READINGS ON THE HEART (1973)).
24. Where chances draw Bayesian inferences from the available evidence.
25. Among the relevant variables are the likelihood that the statement is true, the likelihood that
the statement will induce the listener to act in a certain way, and the scale of harm or benefit if they
do.
26. See infra Part I.
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carton of eggs would choose a clearly worse substitute like beef or pork.27
Not only would egg consumers be better off if eggs turned out to be as
harmless as the industry claimed, but hearing the claims may have made
consumers better off even if the egg industry’s claims were false.28
The specter of returning to the era of the snake oil salesman has pushed
the government to place rote rules of scientific substantiation over the
practical effects on consumers. But even snake oil is unfairly maligned.
The oils made from Chinese water snakes that were used in liniments in
the nineteenth century actually did reduce inflammation.29 Compared to
the drivel that passed for medicine at the turn of the twentieth century,30
snake oil was legitimately promising. (Compare, for example, the doctor’s
orders that Marcel Proust followed for his treatment of severe asthma,
which consisted mostly of smoking.31)
When federal investigators shut down the production of Stanley’s
Snake Oil in 1917, they did so because Stanley’s Snake Oil did not
actually contain any snake oil. Its labeling and promotion contained a
verifiably false claim about contents.32 It is ironic, given snake oil’s
genuine medicinal advantages over other patent medicines of the day, that
the episode is remembered as a valuable clearing-out of false therapeutic
claims.33
Commercial speech is not the only area of First Amendment
jurisprudence that suffers from a truth orientation. Factual claims in the
27. Note, though, that the link between saturated fat and heart disease is also not terribly well
supported. Nina Teicholz, The Questionable Link Between Saturated Fats and Heart Disease, WALL
ST. J. (May 6, 2014, 10:25 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-questionable-link-betweensaturated-fat-and-heart-disease-1399070926 [https://perma.cc/89SW-SYNJ].
28. Moreover, it is entirely possible that the egg industry’s ads refuting the theory that dietary
cholesterol causes heart disease reduced egg consumption rather than increasing it by directing
attention to a debate that scared consumers. See generally McIntosh, supra note 23.
29. Lakshmi Gandhi, A History of ‘Snake Oil Salesmen,’ NPR (Aug. 26, 2013, 11:55 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/08/26/215761377/a-history-of-snake-oil-salesmen
[https://perma.cc/F6WZ-JJ3T].
30. See STEVEN BRILL, AMERICA’S BITTER PILL 19–20 (2015) (describing the primitive state of
hospital care in the early twentieth century).
31. Mark Jackson, “Divine Stramonium”: The Rise and Fall of Smoking for Asthma, 54 MED. HIST.
171, 171–72 (2010).
32. Prosecutions for false claims that are relatively simple to invalidate protect “consumers’ interest
in getting what they paid for.” Rebecca Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle: The First Amendment, Fairness,
and Corporate Reputation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1457, 1463 (2009) [hereinafter Tushnet, Fighting
Freestyle].
33. The federal complaint alleged that Stanley misbranded his oil by “falsely and fraudulently
represent[ing] it as a remedy for all pain,” but the investigation was prompted by an analysis of the
oil itself, which found that the product was made mostly from mineral oil and a few other substances,
none of which were snake oil. Gandhi, supra note 29.
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public discourse are given too much protection out of fear that the claim
may have a tiny chance of turning out to be correct someday. Courts have
effectively immunized even unqualified claims that contradict accepted
knowledge and have a high chance of causing foreseeable harm unless
they fall into traditionally exempted categories like fraud or defamation.34
While courts deserve credit for recognizing the dangers of censoring
debates in the public sphere, these concerns have blinded courts to
regulatory solutions that sound in risk. If claims that are very likely to be
false are also likely to cause harm, the state can intervene on behalf of
public safety without imposing a singular and authoritative definition of
truth.35
This Article takes a system-wide look at the First Amendment
treatment of contested factual claims and lays the groundwork to moor
free speech theory to concrete harm. The shift requires reversal of some
of the precedents that had minimized the importance of epistemic
uncertainty for commercial speakers and essentialized it for public
speakers. But these are necessary corrections. The more enduring trend in
free speech analysis is one that allows government restrictions on speech
when (and only when) the government has credible proof of harm.36
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I clarifies the scope of the
project and defines sets and subsets of factual claims that will be used
throughout the Article. Part II describes how free speech law protects
contested knowledge today, and how those protections depend in large
part on the type of speaker. Part III addresses the flaws in an obsessively
truth-oriented approach to free speech, particularly with respect to the
most and least protected speakers—the press and commercial speakers,
respectively. Finally, Part IV anticipates where the law is headed. It uses
a risk-oriented approach to show that government regulation can expand
in the public discourse but must be reined in, to some extent, in the
commercial speech doctrine.

34. See discussions infra sections II.A, II.B, and III.B.
35. Defamation and fraud laws provide a roadmap, combining a likelihood of falsity with negative
consequences to a subject or listener. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 162 (AM. LAW INST.
1965) (defining fraudulent misstatements); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW
INST. 1977) (defining defamatory communications).
36. See generally Joseph Russomanno, Cause and Effect: The Free Speech Transformation as
Scientific Revolution, 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 213 (2015) (documenting a history of growing
skepticism for the harms the government claims the speech will cause).
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FACTUAL CLAIMS

This Part will mark the parameters of the Article. It defines the category
of speech that consists of factual claims, and further subdivides this
category into subcategories that have important legal implications. The
definitions I provide here will not fully satisfy philosophers of science,
but they will be precise enough to be serviceable.
First, free speech law already makes a distinction between factual and
non-factual statements. Factual claims are falsifiable. They can
theoretically, at least, be compared to objective reality.37 Non-factual
speech includes political ideologies, moral philosophies, artistic
expression, opinions about subjective subjects, and nonsense that asserts
no claims about the observable world and therefore cannot be proven
false.
Dividing the domains of the factual and nonfactual sometimes depends
on context and linguistics. For example, consider the question, “when
does human life begin?” A response to this question will depend very
much on what the question-poser means by the word “life.” If life is
determined based on spiritual or moral considerations, answers will be
nonfactual claims. If life is defined as the point in fetal development at
which the fetus is more than 50% likely to have the pain receptors and
memory necessary to experience pain, answers will be factual claims.
Even if we do not currently have the relevant empirical evidence, there is
an answer, however inaccessible.38 Courts may occasionally err when
categorizing statements as fact or opinion,39 but the distinction is
frequently used in First Amendment law.

37. I should note that by recognizing the difference between fact and opinion, I am embracing the
notion that an objective reality exists. This is controversial in some circles; Nietzsche, for example,
thought that all human conceptions are “only an interpretation and arrangement of the world
(according to our own requirements, if I may say so!)—and not an explanation of the world.”
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (W. Kaufmann trans., 1996) (1886). But courts and
lawmakers have rejected strong forms of relativism.
38. For an excellent account of the relationship between legal, scientific, and religious debates and
how policy debates are converted into empirical questions, see David Faigman, Where Law and
Science (and Religion?) Meet, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1659 (2015).
39. For example, I believe the Supreme Court miscategorized the statements leading to defamation
liability in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (upholding the district court’s
conclusion that the phrase “individual instruments heard through the Bose system seemed to grow to
gigantic proportions and tended to wander about the room” was a factual claim).
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Figure 3:
Diagram of Factual Claims

Within the vast and diverse universe of factual claims, there are a few
critical subcategories. First, there is accepted knowledge, which is
comprised of factual propositions that are believed to be correct based on
some epistemological standard. This is what we believe we know. As
shown in Figure 1, not all accepted knowledge is true. Statements that fall
into the accepted knowledge category might not be true because the
epistemological standard may be premised on an overlooked assumption
that turns out to be wrong, or because the standard has, by necessity, a
little bit of tolerance for error. But statements that are part of accepted
knowledge are supported by enough observations and credible evidence
to clear the high bar established by the relevant experts and standardbearers. As long as accepted knowledge is well defined, the category of
anti-knowledge can also be used. Anti-knowledge includes statements that
are in direct conflict with the statements contained in accepted knowledge.
If knowledge is the functional proxy for truth, then anti-knowledge is the
functional proxy for falsehoods. These are the sets of claims that have
been proven, based on prevailing scientific standards, to be incorrect.
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Determining what should fall inside and outside the subcategory of
accepted knowledge is an act with well-known hazards.40 If public law is
going to use the category of accepted knowledge to determine the truth of
a statement, it will invariably have to rely on experts to define and apply
the standards. And those experts may have culturally or politically
induced blind spots and are also susceptible to self-interested biases,
particularly if their status as experts is put at risk. Thus, because there will
always be disagreement about how knowledge should be defined, the
outer edges of the accepted knowledge category will be jittery.
Nevertheless, even if there is no timeless and universally accepted
standard for determining knowledge, even people who disagree on the
standards can agree that much of what makes up scientific discussion and
debate falls outside of both the accepted knowledge and anti-knowledge
circles, no matter how they are defined.
That leaves the residual—contested knowledge. It forms a wide terrain
of claims that may have some evidence in support, and perhaps some
evidence in conflict, but not enough of either sort to conclusively place
the statement into the accepted knowledge or anti-knowledge buckets.41
This is the fog of science, and it is where our current set of constitutional
rules tends to falter by using a true/false dichotomy.
This is not to suggest that contested claims have equal chances of
becoming accepted knowledge. Statements in this category can be moreor less-well supported, and people may rationally rely on the better
supported statements even if they do not meet the high standards for
knowledge, and may reject baseless speculation until some evidence is
produced.42 The chances that contested claims are correct, given current

40. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 77–91 (2012). Note that
throughout this Article, I analyze the application of law to contested claims assuming that the evidence
that may accumulate for those claims are part of the uncontroversial process of “normal science.” Id.
at 10. The recommendations from this Article may also apply to claims that so challenge accepted
knowledge that they would require a paradigm shift, but it would require more analysis to be sure.
For one thing, claims that demand a paradigm shift usually mount their attack from the “antiknowledge” category of speech (the functional equivalent of false speech), and thus will have trouble
receiving a hearing not only from the scientific community but also from the courts.
41. For example, in climate science, the statement that the earth’s temperature is steadily warming,
and that humans have contributed to the rate of warming, will usually be categorized as established
knowledge. Denials of these claims are therefore anti-knowledge. But there is conflicting evidence
and bona fide debate about the rate and acceleration of warming, so reasonable estimates of these
figures fall outside all of the subcategories of knowledge, anti-knowledge, and baseless claims.
42. Claims can vary both by the quality of the methodology and the quality of the execution of the
study. I embrace the hierarchy of methodology that the scientific community currently uses, with
randomized experiments at the top, natural experiments and instrumental variables next, followed by
well-controlled regressions, and uncontrolled time series, graphs, and statistics last. John J. Donohue,
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evidence, will vary widely. The only thing that these claims have in
common is that we currently lack the empirical power to confidently count
them as accepted knowledge or anti-knowledge.43
Because there is wide variation in the quality of contested claims, the
opportunity for havoc is both obvious and alarming. Poorly supported
claims can grow a disproportionate amount of attention and can steer
people into making bad decisions. As John Donohue has put it, “[w]hat
the scholarly review . . . properly deemed to be an absence of evidence
can appear in the hands of advocates and the press to be overwhelming
econometric support.”44 Clearly the First Amendment should not shield
all weakly supported factual claims from regulation. But treating claims
in this category as either true or false, as courts and other regulators often
do, is a disservice to sustainable speech law.
The next Part describes how factual claims, particularly those falling
within the contested-knowledge category, are protected by the First
Amendment today. Free speech protection relies heavily on the type of
speaker and a true/false dichotomy. Later Parts will argue that for
restrictions on pure speech, falsity should annul First Amendment
protection only for anti-knowledge. For partially substantiated claims
(which are related to, but not the same as, insufficiently substantiated
claims), speech interests should be balanced against.
II.

PROTECTION TODAY

Free speech doctrine has long permitted courts and other regulators,
fallible as they are, to determine the truth and falsity of a speaker’s
statements. In some contexts, such as fraud, the falsity of a statement
simultaneously fulfills an element of the charge and helps remove the
charge from the ambit of First Amendment protection. But fraud, deceit,
and other conscious lies are the easy cases for a falsity approach to speech.
When speakers do not actually believe the statements they make, the

Empirical Evaluation of Law: The Dream and the Nightmare, 17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313, 324
(2015).
43. Two related concepts from statistics provide a helpful metaphor here: power and confidence.
In statistical studies, a large number of observations will increase the power of a hypothesis test—it
will make it more likely that a false null hypothesis is rejected. By analogy, a large number of
empirical studies and replication efforts, or a smaller number of more methodologically strong
studies, can make a factual claim increasingly credible, particularly if the evidence converges on a
consistent answer.
44. Donohue, supra note 42, at 334.
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state’s determination that the statements are “false” does not pose serious
intellectual impositions on the speaker.45
Courts tread more lightly when a speaker lacks specific intent to
deceive the audience, which is typically the case for contested claims.
Constitutional constraints on the law of defamation, for example, permit
recovery against a speaker who makes negligent statements only in certain
narrow conditions.46
This Part explains how First Amendment law currently applies to
contested knowledge. Courts draw strong First Amendment distinctions
based not only on the potential falsity of the speech, but on the type of
speaker making the claim. For the most part, the current approach has an
internal logic. Courts use speaker type as a stand in for a set of factors that
have a rational connection to the likelihood that a listener will act on the
claim without further deliberation.
The players in the Constitutional drama are the press, the politician, the
peer, the protector, the peddler, and the public authority. This Part will
explore the free speech case law applying to each.
A.

The Press

The press consists of all speakers who offer a noncommercial message
for wide distribution.47 There is a popular misconception that Fox News
successfully won a legal “right to lie” in a 1990s case involving reporting
about dairy farms.48 Although that folk legal analysis is not correct, it is

45. The regulation of lies may contravene the constitution or be a very bad idea for other reasons
unrelated to the determination of falsity, though. See Alan Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies,
Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435 (2015); Spottswood, supra note 21;
Strauss, supra note 7 (on the importance of sincerity). My more limited point here is that within the
category of factual claims, it is less problematic to categorize a knowing lie as a false statement than
other claims made in good faith.
46. E.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Article does not engage with the interesting question of when
a technically true statement may be misleading and therefore treated as false. For more on that, see
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Deceptive Advertising and Taking Responsibility for Others, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FOOD ETHICS 470 (Anne Barnhill et al. eds., 2018); Tushnet, It Depends on
What the Meaning of “False” Is, supra note 21.
47. Speakers who may be peers, protectors, or peddlers in other contexts will be treated as press
speakers when their non-commercial message is made as a contribution to public discourse. This of
course puts quite a lot of pressure on courts to define what a “commercial message” and “public
discourse” are.
48. Did Fox News Sue for the ‘Right to Lie’?, SNOPES (Oct. 2, 2014),
http://www.snopes.com/politics/business/foxlies.asp [https://perma.cc/H97D-LNLA] (describing the
rumors and misinterpretations of New World Comm. of Tampa, Inc. v. Akre, 866 So. 2d 1231 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
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undeniable that contested claims and even anti-knowledge are strongly
protected from government interference when a person speaks to a broad,
indiscriminate audience.49 There are well-known exceptions, such as the
law of defamation,50 but their strict constitutional limits only underscore
the strength of protection for press speech.51
Even in instances where a speaker should know that his claims have
little scientific validity, where the claims, if acted on, are likely to cause
harm, and where the reaction of the audience is entirely foreseeable, First
Amendment case law immunizes the speaker from government
intervention. Public speakers have no duty to ensure that factual claims
are accurate or well supported by the evidentiary record available at the
time. This is the rule that permits the Atkins Diet book and website to
continue promoting an aggressively low carbohydrate diet despite
evidence that the fats and proteins taking their place seem to pose greater
risks of illness and death.52 It is the rule that protected a publisher from
liability when a nursing school textbook gave improper instructions for
the use of an enema, causing injury to a student who tried the technique
on herself.53 In the most famous case along these lines—Winter v. G.P.
Putnam’s Sons54—the rule protected the publisher of an encyclopedia of
mushrooms that assured readers a particular type of mushroom was safe
to eat when in fact it was toxic.55 And it is the rule that protects celebrities,
pundits, and us all when we make a wide range of pseudoscientific
statements in traditional and social media.56

49. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) (“[T]he Constitution protects expression and
association without regard . . . to the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which
are offered.”).
50. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
51. A public figure must prove actual knowledge on the part of the speaker that the defamatory
statement was false. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). Moreover, courts will
not assume that every factually verifiable statement is likely to be taken seriously enough to constitute
defamatory speech. Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988).
52. Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 279
F. App’x 40 (2d Cir. 2008).
53. Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1216–18 (D. Md. 1988).
54. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991). The contents of books were not suitable subjects for product
liability claims. Id. at 1034–36.
55. Id. at 1037–38.
56. For example, the movie Vaxxed contained a number of dubious claims about the risks of
vaccination. Ariana E. Cha, 7 Things About Vaccines and Autism that the Movie ‘Vaxxed’ Won’t Tell
You, WASH. POST (May 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2016/
05/25/7-things-about-vaccines-and-autism-that-the-movie-vaxxed-wont-tellyou/?utm_term=.cb7d0a0c671f [https://perma.cc/M46K-B73J].
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Liability for dubious scientific claims made in public discourse has
been tested over and over, always with the same constitutional result: the
speakers and publishers win.57 Courts nestle their analysis in the rhetoric
of the Marketplace of Ideas.58 That conceit was practically made for
scientific debate, where competing claims use increasingly elaborate
proof to vie for the beliefs of experts and laymen alike.59 As with
defamation, the First Amendment must leave “breathing space” for
falsehoods made in the course of public discussion because the alternative
would raise the cost of discourse and inquiry and could chill a good deal
of true speech.60
These principles are so fixed in American legal culture that the First
Amendment does not often have to be pushed into service. Liability for
false factual claims frequently fails within the prima facie case. In tort
law, plaintiffs lose the duty and causation elements when they are injured

57. See McMillan v. Togus Reg’l Office, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 120 F. App’x 849 (2d Cir.
2005) (incorrect statements about Agent Orange in National Academy of Sciences publication);
Barden v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1994) (false qualifications of
attorneys listed in book about civil remedies for victims of child abuse); Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co.,
694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988) (poor advice about the treatment of constipation in nursing
textbook); Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. La. 1987) (published fraudulent
advertisements of third party bank); Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
(published bad instructions for mixing mordant, causing an explosion); Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d
1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (poisonous ingredients listed in cook book recipe); Alm v. Van
Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (poor instructions in how-to book about
tool-making that caused injuries); Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1986) (negligent
misrepresentation that certain securities were trading with interest when in fact they were trading flat).
58. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035 (1991) (“We place a high priority
on the unfettered exchange of ideas.”).
59. The version of the marketplace that best explains the contest of hypotheses in pursuit of
scientific truth is John Stuart Mill’s rather than Oliver Wendell Holmes’s because the former believed
disagreement promotes individuals’ interest in and capacity for knowledge while Holmes’s may have
been more post-modern, regarding the prevailing truth as a collective, political process. Irene M. Ten
Cate, Speech Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35 (2010).
60. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341–42 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964).
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by their own credulity.61 Fraud claims against publishers and authors often
fail on the reliance element.62
Modern regulatory agencies do not have the same long tradition of
constitutional avoidance. For example, in the 1990s, the Food & Drug
Administration (FDA) and the public health community were caught by
surprise when the FDA guidance limiting “Industry-Supported Scientific
and Educational Activities” was struck down by a federal court,63 but from
a First Amendment perspective, it was an easy case. If the heirs of Dr.
Atkins can engage in public debate about diet and nutrition, all the while
making revenue off official Atkins Diet products and supplements, then
surely a pharmaceutical company can engage in public discourse by
publishing and distributing serious original research and by organizing
educational symposia.64
Given the strength of protection for the press in all its forms, one
exception to the general free speech immunity stands out: technical
documents. Maps that promise to provide complete and accurate
topologies have been treated as defective products when inaccuracies in
the map cause physical harm to a pilot.65 This exception has been carefully
cabined and has resisted attempts to expand it to materials like nonfiction
books.66 Courts have limited the exception to informational products that

61. For example, the Atkins diet case described above faltered on the element of duty. The court
found that the Atkins company did not owe its subscribers a duty to refrain from negligent
misrepresentation. Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2006),
aff’d, 279 F. App’x 40 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Underwager v. Salter, 22 F.3d 730, 733–34 (7th Cir.
1994) (denying defamation claims brought by and against authors in a scientific debate on the grounds
that all authors believe what they have said and lack the requisite mental state for common law
defamation claims).
62. See, e.g., Pfau v. Mortenson, 858 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1158–59 (D. Mont. 2012), aff’d mem., 542
F. App’x 557 (9th Cir. 2013).
63. Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg.
64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997) (Guidance); Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998)
(striking it down), vacated in part sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
64. Gorran, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 327–28; see also Oxycal Labs., Inc. v. Jeffers, 909 F. Supp. 719,
722 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (limiting liability for misrepresentations to commercial advertising speech and
dismissing claims brought against publishers of a book who also sold products promoted by the book);
Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (negligent suit against authors of a diet book
coming to the same result). Distinguishing between public discourse and commercial speech can be
both difficult and highly consequential for free speech law.
65. See, e.g., Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
66. Pfau, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 1160–61 (finding that the publisher of two nonfiction books was
immune from suit for alleged misstatements even if the misstatements were intentional despite
advertising on their website that the book was “nonfiction” and “true”).
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are used more like instruments than intellectual fodder.67 Other
instruments that convey information such as blood pressure cuffs and
speedometers are similarly concerned with verifiable accuracy. The
exception for instruments mark the possibility that regulation might be
able to expand to other forms of anti-knowledge if the rules are carefully
crafted.
B.

The Politician

Political candidates, activists, and lobbyists are a special case of the
“press” category described in section A. The First Amendment protects
these speakers as much as, and possibly more than, the general category
of speakers who direct their comments to a wide audience. Their faulty
statements, even deliberate lies, are practically untouchable.68
Political speakers merit their own treatment because the stakes are quite
high. Political ignorance and influential political lies can cause policy
changes with sweeping ramifications and externalities of the sort that bad
diet books do not. Two explanations for this heightened protection stand
out because they provide insights that will reverberate later in this Article.
Moreover, although they lead to the same result, they are exact opposites.
The first explanation comes from the democratic self-government
theory of the First Amendment explained and refined by Alexander
Meiklejohn and Robert Post, among others.69 A healthy democracy
requires freedom of public discourse so that voters as agents of the
political process can speak freely and make their decisions without
government tampering. Yet one may fairly ask whether democratic
legitimacy would increase, rather than decrease, if the government had

67. Moreover, the exception might be narrower even than the universe of technical maps because,
for example, at least one state court immunized Google from negligence liability when its Google
Maps application directed a pedestrian to cross a busy rural highway. Rosenberg v. Harwood, No.
100916536, 2011 WL 3153314 (Utah Dist. Ct. May 27, 2011).
68. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 734 (2012) (requiring actual harm); Brown v. Hartlage,
456 U.S. 45 (1982) (requiring actual malice to regulate misstatements made during campaigns);
Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, supra note 4, at 898–99. The Supreme Court left open the
possibility that regulations of some verifiable lies could withstand strict scrutiny as long as the
government was prepared to show that the law was “actually necessary” to prevent harm. But the
favored remedy for the multitude of scenarios in which proof of necessity is lacking is to encourage
more speech. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 729.
69. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948); Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2367–71 (defining a “participatory theory” of free speech
similar to Meiklejohn’s but widening the scope to include the whole discursive process).
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limited powers to ban falsehoods perpetuated by political movements and
candidates who stand to gain from the deception.
There are some good responses consistent with the democratic selfgovernment theory of free speech. First, ideological debates are often
propelled through anecdotes and statistics that may be wrong in their
specifics but nevertheless resonate with important values.70 The Black
Lives Matter movement may be wrong about the scale of racial disparities
in police shootings,71 and the Blue Lives Matter movement may be wrong
about the trends in on-the-job fatalities of law enforcement officers,72 but
fixating on the accuracy of specific claims misses the general, accurate
assertions about racial disparity in criminal enforcement and danger in
police work. It also misses the conflict in nonfactual values. Moreover, a
government that can censor falsehoods can exploit that power to corrupt
the political process and horde power.73
The second reason to relieve political speakers from liabilities for lies
is pragmatic rather than aspirational. Democracy tends to demand lying,
no matter how principled or well informed the politicians are. Recent
elections provide enough proof of this: Senator Ted Cruz lied about his
record on immigration-related voting,74 presidential candidate Carly
Fiorina claimed that the number of abortions increases every year,75

70. “Even irrational and abusive speech can, within particular circumstances, serve as a vehicle for
the construction of democratic legitimacy.” Post, supra note 69, at 2371.
71. Compare Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of
Force (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22,399, 2016) (finding no racial disparity
in officer-involved shootings, but finding a significant disparity in other uses of force that were not
explained with a large set of behavioral and circumstantial controls), with Herstory, BLACK LIVES
MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/herstory/ [perma.cc/Y9C8-HMXJ] (“Black Lives
Matter is an ideological and political intervention in a world where Black lives are systematically and
intentionally targeted for demise.”).
72. Compare Causes of Law Enforcement Deaths, NAT’L L. ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEMORIAL
FUND, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/officer-fatalities-data/causes.html [https://perma.cc/ A3UMWBNM] (last updated Apr. 10, 2017), with About Blue Lives Matter, BLUE LIVES MATTER (May 14,
2017),
https://www.themaven.net/bluelivesmatter/pages/rF54b2VNMUOrl7wfh8vRXQ
[https://perma.cc/4E6B-5DRR] (“Unjust attacks from the new media, celebrities and politicians have
damaged community relations and endanger the lives and safety of law enforcement officers.”).
73. See Jane Bambauer & Derek Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335,
386–88 (2017).
74. Ilya Somin, Ted Cruz and the Use of Deception to Exploit Political Ignorance, WASH. POST:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2016/01/11/ted-cruz-and-the-use-of-deception-to-exploit-political-ignorance/?utm_
term=.8ce74f706e77 [https://perma.cc/JEF2-R8LE].
75. Louis Jacobson, Carly Fiorina Incorrect that U.S. Has a ‘Record Number of Abortions Year
After Year,’ POLITIFACT (Jan. 20, 2016), www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jan/20/
carly-fiorina/carly-fiorina-incorrect-us-has-record-number-abort/ [https://perma.cc/YF59-58KF].
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President Obama lied about his support of gay marriage in 2008,76 and
President Trump surely did not believe his own campaign rhetoric about
the feasibility of rapid deportations or building a continuous wall along
the entire Mexican border.77 But the phenomenon is not new. Abraham
Lincoln had to falsely disavow the Republican Party platform (which
pursued the goal of equal political rights for freed slaves) in order to get
his foot in the door for national office.78 Good politicians understand that
the electorate can take only so much truth at a time. They understand, to
borrow Emily Dickinson, that they must “[t]ell all the truth but tell it
slant.”79
Under this theory, free speech does not facilitate democratic selfgovernment, it saves us from it.80 In politics, the audience is less inclined
to change ideology based on new information and more inclined to choose
information based on preexisting ideology.81 Factual accuracy has limited
positive influence on political audiences, and conversely, the stakes from
factual inaccuracy are not as grave as they may seem.
The public and political marketplace of ideas lags behind the progress
of scientific knowledge. Politicians continue to deny the existence of
global warming well after a consensus has formed among scientists that it
does exist.82 But even if it does not conform to the best available science,
public discourse still makes progress. Pro-life politicians can say many

76. Zeke J. Miller, Axelrod: Obama Misled Nation When He Opposed Gay Marriage in 2008, TIME
(Feb. 10, 2015), http://time.com/3702584/gay-marriage-axelrod-obama/ [https://perma.cc/42EM3MUS].
77. Julia Preston et al., What Would It Take for Donald Trump to Deport 11 Million and Build a
Wall?, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/us/politics/donald-trumpimmigration.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6XJY-22ZZ].
78. THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES: THE FIRST COMPLETE, UNEXPURGATED TEXT 40–44
(Harold Holzer ed., 2004).
79. Emily Dickinson, Tell All the Truth but Tell It Slant, POETRY FOUND.,
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/56824/tell-all-the-truth-but-tell-it-slant-1263
[https://perma.cc/Q5TP-R5ZU] (“Tell all the truth but tell it slant— / Success in Circuit lies / Too
bright for our infirm Delight / The Truth’s superb surprise / As Lightning to the Children eased / With
explanation kind / The Truth must dazzle gradually / Or every man be blind—.”).
80. Peter H. Aronson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 63–67
(1982) (describing how Congress rationally and routinely delegates hard decisions to avoid political
accountability for them).
81. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 147, 148 (2006).
82. See Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, How G.O.P. Leaders Came to View Climate Change as
Fake Science, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/us/politics/
republican-leaders-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/JLA5-6FGG]. For a detailed history of the
building of scientific consensus through climate modeling, see PAUL N. EDWARDS, A VAST
MACHINE: COMPUTER MODELS, CLIMATE DATA, AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL WARMING (2010).
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things about abortion that have dubious factual support, but when Todd
Akin, a candidate for the U.S. Senate, said that the female body will avoid
pregnancy if “it’s a legitimate rape,”83 his support even among
conservatives collapsed.84 Public debate, the messiest form of all possible
discourses, still places some self-regulated limits on junk science.85
C.

The Peer

The peer speaker is the business or social acquaintance who provides
information to a private audience rather than a public one. It is what most
of us are most of the time when we speak.
Peer speakers receive fewer protections from the First Amendment than
the press. Under the common law, peer speakers who gave bad factual
information in a context in which they should have known that the listener
was vulnerable or was reasonably relying on it could be sued for
negligence if the listener suffered physical or financial injury as a result.86
Legal obligations to give accurate information can grow from the reliance

83. Chris Gentilviso, Todd Akin on Abortion: ‘Legitimate Rape’ Victims Have ‘Ways to Try to Shut
That Whole Thing Down’ (VIDEO), HUFFPOST (Aug. 19, 2012, 3:25 PM), https://www.huffington
post.com/2012/08/19/todd-akin-abortion-legitimate-rape_n_1807381.html [https://perma.cc/VN2L6M2M].
84. Jennifer Haberkorn, Abortion, Rape Shaped Key Races, POLITICO (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:54 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2012/11/abortion-rape-controversy-shaped-key-races-083449
[https://perma.cc/GR24-EE6N].
85. Some observers of the 2016 presidential election are beginning to doubt that norms and
democratic processes provide enough incentive to tell the truth. But the First Amendment should not
be held responsible for the rhetoric of the 2016 election. After all, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, and France are going through similarly reactionary political moments, see James Poulos,
Younger Le Pen’s Reactionary Politics Tap into Pan-American Sentiment, ORANGE COUNTY REG.
(Apr. 4, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://www.ocregister.com/2017/04/01/younger-le-pens-reactionarypolitics-tap-into-pan-european-sentiment/ [https://perma.cc/62KG-XEFS], and those countries
operate under significantly more restrictive speech laws, see Comparing Hate Speech Laws in the
U.S. and Abroad, NPR (Mar. 3, 2011, 3:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134239713/FranceIsnt-The-Only-Country-To-Prohibit-Hate-Speech [https://perma.cc/QDV9-CSTZ]. The 2016
election seems to be a good example of voters demanding rhetoric rather than being shaped by it.
86. For physical harm: Jurgens v. Poling Transp. Corp., 113 F. Supp. 2d 388, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2000);
Isham v. PADI Worldwide Corp., Nos. 06-00382 DAE BMK, 06-00386 DAE BMK, 2008 WL
2051546 (D. Haw. May 13, 2008); Apollo Capital Fund LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Birmingham v. Fodor’s Travel Publ’ns, Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 75 n.4
(Haw. 1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (a party who
negligently provides false information to another may be liable for “physical harm caused by action
taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information” whether the harm occurs to the
listener or to a third party foreseeably in harm’s way). The plaintiff must prove that the speaker knew
the listener was relying on his statement. For financial harm, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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induced in employment and consumer contractual relationships.87 But the
basic rules also apply to peers who are not in any form of contractual
privity. Landowners providing information to visitors or adults giving
instructions to children can be held responsible for the harm caused by
their advice.88 As a matter of substantive law, peer speech has been
regulated only if specific negligent or malicious false claims cause actual
financial or physical injury,89 so for now, the law for peer speakers is
anchored to harm.
Courts have only occasionally distinguished between verifiable
(accepted) knowledge and contested knowledge in the context of peer
speech. When they do, they explain that factual predictions are not
actionable.90 However, existing negligence law and First Amendment
doctrine does not entirely rule out the possibility that a person or company
could be held liable for a poorly supported contested claim that
foreseeably leads to harm. For one thing, the defamation case law strongly
suggests that private conversations will always receive less protection
than public discourse,91 and the rules for negligent misstatements seem
readily applicable to risky contested knowledge.
D.

The Protector

Protectors are professionals with fiduciary responsibilities to their
clients and patients. They are engaged to guide or even take over the
judgment of their clients, and they have legal obligations to do so
competently. Like peers, protectors speak to private rather than public

87. Isham, 2008 WL 2051546, at *4; Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer
Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31, 33 (2016).
88. See Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 345–46 (Pa. 1959).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Some states have ruled this
out using common law tort duty principles. Deana Pollard Sacks, Constitutionalized Negligence, 89
WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1085–92 (2012).
90. Presidio Enters., Inc., v. Warner Bros. Distrib. Corp., 784 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 1986); Barden
v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 41, 43 (D. Mass. 1994); Logan Equip. Corp. v. Simon
Aerials, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1188, 1200 (D. Mass. 1990); S.F. Design Ctr. Assocs. v. Portman Cos., 50
Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“It is hornbook law that an actionable misrepresentation
must be made about past or existing facts; statements regarding future events are merely deemed
opinions.”). The exceptions involve statements about the future where the predicted act is entirely in
the control of the speaker. See Barrett Assocs., Inc. v. Aronson, 190 N.E.2d 867, 868 (Mass. 1963);
Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 320 N.E.2d 919, 924 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974).
91. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985).
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audiences, so fiduciary duties wind up being critical. These special duties
are the only things separating protectors from peers.92
Protectors can be held responsible for contested claims when their
advice is poorly supported by contemporary scientific evidence.93 Lowquality scientific opinions, be they misdiagnoses, recommendations, or
doctors’ orders, were historically treated as conduct rather than speech
and rarely got the attention of constitutional lawyers. But common law
courts were also reserved when regulating protectors’ judgment in areas
of epistemic uncertainty. Under the common law, malpractice through
negligent guidance was only penalized in extreme cases. First, as with all
forms of malpractice, opinion malpractice could lead to liability only after
harm materialized and could be causally linked to the doctor’s advice.94
Even then, a doctor’s advice breached a duty of care only if it was based
on a theory that failed to have a substantial minority of subscribers.95 On
subjects with known areas of disagreement or uncertainty, doctors can
satisfy the custom-based standard of care so long as they do not give
advice that is outside the range where reasonable minds disagree.
The laxity in the standard for breach is a natural byproduct of the
uncertainty that pervades the medical and professional fields. Sometimes
the standard of care that a doctor must conform to includes a treatment
that has not been well studied or a drug that has not been approved by the
FDA to treat the condition.96 Even with this flexibility, though, protectors
are regulated more than peers, who are usually free to give bad advice.
It may seem odd that the speech of a professional advisor, who is paid
by clients and therefore has the incentives to serve their interests, can be
more heavily regulated than the speech of a peer who may have any
number of motivations.97 But the paradox is explained by reliance.
92. It is possible that, with more attention, we may find a sliding scale of free speech protection
that is relatively strong for contractual parties, less strong for employer-employee relationships, and
weaker still for fiduciaries.
93. Other scholars have explained in greater detail than I do here the logic and residual puzzles in
the regulation of professional speech. See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, Free Speech, Occupational
Speech, and Psychotherapy, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681 (2016); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial
Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
772, 845 (1999); Claudia Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L. REV. 1150 (2016).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
95. Note, though, that courts are increasingly willing to deviate from the custom standard and using
an assessment of reasonableness used for other forms of negligence. For a discussion of the traditional
custom standard and the shift away, see Philip G. Peters, The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom:
Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163 (2000).
96. See Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1989).
97. See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
289 (2006) (ratings agencies and the race to the bottom).
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Professionals speak in a context where the audience is most likely to act
on their advice without second-guessing.98 The free speech rule for
protectors is therefore consistent with the rules for peers because they,
too, can be held liable for speech if they know a listener is reasonably
relying on its accuracy. Protectors are a special case of the peer rule where
the reasonableness of reliance is automatically presumed.
The free speech rules for protectors are also consistent with a set of
normative goals. Generally speaking, the law is designed to facilitate trust
with professionals who work as the listener’s agents. Government has no
such interest in facilitating trust in public debate. In fact, the public
interest is better served by promoting a healthy skepticism for information
that does not come through a regulated professional relationship.
As a general matter, First Amendment jurisprudence has not disrupted
the traditional approach to regulating professional speech.99 But there are
two sources of First Amendment tension.
The first comes from defining fiduciaries. Fiduciary duties maintain the
boundary between protectors and peers, ensuring that the latter do not
have to take on the burdens of education and self-censorship. But
fiduciary duties are purely legal constructs. The coherence of the
information policy described above depends on the state doing a good job
applying fiduciary duties to speakers who induce reasonable reliance of
their clients without wrapping in others. In practice, there has been quite
a lot of slippage between the peer and protector categories because of the
ipse dixit nature of defining fiduciary responsibilities.
Sometimes the state can too easily convert a peer speaker into a heavily
regulated protector based solely on the type of advice a peer attempts to
give. For example, advice about legal strategy, even when it is good
advice, will violate the business and professions codes in most states that
prohibit the unauthorized practice of law if the speaker is unlicensed.100
98. See generally Wendy G. Couture, The Collision Between the First Amendment and Securities
Fraud, 65 ALA. L. REV. 903 (2014) (persuasively showing why a malice standard should apply to
securities analysts, credit agencies, and financial journalists who make public comments about
corporate securities); Spottswood, supra note 21, at 1250 (“there are situations in which false
statements are not very likely to produce any sort of useful argument, but instead are expected to be
relied upon by a listener without a great deal of reflection,” such as attorney advice).
99. See, e.g., Shea v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 146 Cal. Rptr. 653, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (“The
state’s obligation and power to protect its citizens by regulation of the professional conduct of its
health practitioners is well settled. . . . [T]he First Amendment . . . does not insulate the verbal
charlatan from responsibility for his conduct; nor does it impede the State in the proper exercise of its
regulatory functions.”). Courts have occasionally nibbled on the edges by forcing licensing boards to
relax advertising restrictions. See Renee Knake, Legal Information, the Consumer Law Market, and
the First Amendment, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2843 (2014).
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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These rules can stray too far from the theory of reasonable reliance that
undergirds the information restrictions.101
Other times, the scope of fiduciary responsibilities is under-inclusive.
Law professors, to take an example close to home, cannot be sued for
educational malpractice no matter how much and how reasonably their
students rely on their teaching.102 Financial interest and actual reliance are
not sufficient to predict when fiduciary duties will be recognized. Much
depends on the types of trust that the state wants to promote and actively
support.103
First Amendment challenges gain force when fiduciary duties are
expanded to cover more and more services, including pure speech. The
proportion of Americans who are members of licensed professions has
grown six-fold since the 1950s,104 each potentially facing a set of
restrictions on their advice and contested claims. As professional
regulation expands, so do the incentives to bring constitutional challenges.
Courts are likely to find that some forms of professional regulation are
insufficiently tailored to the exceptional special relationships that once
justified special First Amendment treatment.
New technology will make this First Amendment battle zone even
more salient. Many new apps and software products are designed to give
customized advice and predictions to their users.105 These
communications technologies can be used not only to enhance doctorpatient, lawyer-client, and accountant-client relationships, but to
substitute them. Courts will have to decide whether the state can treat

101. What it means for reliance to be “reasonable” also invites courts to expand the application of
fiduciary duties. For example, a California court recently allowed a negligent misrepresentation claim
against Moody’s rating agency to proceed because Moody’s held itself out as “possessing superior
knowledge or special information or expertise regarding the subject matter” even though the particular
financial goods at issue in the case were restricted for sale only to sophisticated market participants.
Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Moody’s Inv’rs Serv., 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 238, 253–54 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014).
102. RONALD STANDLER, EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN THE USA 10, 39 (2013) (“Plaintiff
(nearly) always loses.”).
103. Jane Bambauer, The Relationships Between Speech and Conduct, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1941, 1948–49 (2016).
104. Brad Hershein et al., Nearly 30 Percent of Workers in the U.S. Need a License to Perform
Their Job: It Is Time to Examine Occupational Licensing Practices, BROOKINGS (Jan. 27, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/01/27/nearly-30-percent-of-workers-in-the-u-s-needa-license-to-perform-their-job-it-is-time-to-examine-occupational-licensing-practices/
[https://perma.cc/QW72-Y29P].
105. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY
AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 6–7 (2015) [hereinafter FDA, MOBILE MEDICAL
APPLICATIONS].

06 - Bambauer.docx (Do Not Delete)

100

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/18/2018 4:51 PM

[Vol. 93:73

these emerging information services as fiduciaries (protectors) or must let
them pass as cut-rate peer alternatives.106
The second source of constitutional pressure comes from the burdens
of the regulations that apply to professionals. The common law approach
to malpractice tethered the law to harm by limiting liability to plaintiffs
who suffered damages and by holding doctors and other professionals to
a low standard of care.107 These restrictions were probably too friendly to
defendants from an accident deterrence standpoint, but they managed to
avoid free speech pitfalls by ensuring that a penalized defendant not only
said something dubious but also caused harm. Recent free speech
controversies in the realm of professional speech proceed without as much
evidence that clients will be harmed.
For example, four states and the District of Columbia have banned
licensed therapists from practicing “Sexual Orientation Change Efforts”
(SOCE)—a set of protocols that some clinicians use to try to change the
sexual orientation of their clients.108 SOCE is typically practiced by
religiously motivated therapists who treat homosexuality as an ailment
that can or should be cured.109 Two federal circuits have upheld the bans
against constitutional challenge, one of them (the Ninth Circuit) without
applying any First Amendment scrutiny.110 Marc Blitz summarized the
thinking: “[w]hat matters, for First Amendment purposes, is not that the
‘talking cure’ involves talking, but that it aims at curing.”111 The states
banning SOCE practices view them as the worst sort of snake oil—as a
promise that is destined to fail, in an attempt to treat a condition that is not
even an ailment. Indeed, there is no strong evidence that SOCE practices
achieve their desired ends. But as the American Psychological
Association report on SOCE acknowledged, there is no strong evidence
that SOCE causes physical or emotional distress to the patients receiving
them, either.112
106. Elsewhere I argue that regulating these apps and services as fiduciaries is more appropriate
and more welfare-enhancing than regulating them as products, but that public choice problems are
likely to lead to over-regulation. See Jane Bambauer, Dr. Robot, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383 (2017).
107. See generally B. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United States, 467
CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 339 (2008).
108. Blitz, supra note 93, at 682.
109. See id. at 752–53.
110. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014); King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d
Cir. 2014). In Pickup, the Ninth Circuit makes a lazy comparison to traditional malpractice liability
of the sort I criticize earlier in this Part. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1054–55.
111. Blitz, supra note 93, at 683.
112. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 42 (2009) (“We
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The restrictions on SOCE differ from traditional malpractice liability
not only because the rules apply prospectively, but because the rules
operate in an area of known evidentiary uncertainty. The SOCE laws
permit the government, rather than therapists, to determine the best advice
on a topic where the science is underdeveloped. These laws are
distinguishable from a potential law (which Italy has adopted but no U.S.
state has) banning pediatricians from advising patients against
vaccination.113 A ban on vaccination dissuasion would target antiknowledge since that therapeutic advice conflicts with a large body of
high quality studies. By contrast, the SOCE laws settle a debate where
empirical evidence is thin and highly politically charged, and without
credible proof of harm. They set a precedent that for professional
speakers, contested knowledge can be restricted.
E.

The Peddler

The peddler is the commercial speaker whose statements are directed
at potential customers. Speakers fall into the “peddler” category only
when they are engaging in commercial speech—that is, when they are
promoting sales. Under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission,114 commercial speech receives a lower form of First
Amendment protection even when it is true,115 and no protection at all
when it is false or misleading.116
As we have seen already, speakers with a financial interest in their
speech are not automatically engaging in commercial speech; they can be
members of the press, peer, or protector categories when their public or
private statements concern something other than advertising.117 Thus, the
“peddler” category is dependent on how courts distinguish commercial
from non-commercial speech.
conclude that there is a dearth of scientifically sound research on the safety of SOCE. Early and recent
research studies provide no clear indication of the prevalence of harmful outcomes among people who
have undergone efforts to change their sexual orientation or the frequency of occurrence of harm
because no study to date of adequate scientific rigor has been explicitly designed to do so.”).
113. Laura Cuppini, Doctors Advising Against Vaccines Risk Disciplinary Action, CORRIERE
DELLA SERA (July 20, 2016), http://www.corriere.it/english/16_luglio_20/doctors-advising-againstvaccines-risk-disciplinary-action-e2455216-4e75-11e6-8e8b-1212ced41b8e.shtml
[https://perma.cc/PP8X-F2T8].
114. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
115. Id. at 562–63.
116. Id. at 564.
117. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983); Groden v. Random House,
Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995) (distinguishing between content of a book and advertisements
promoting sales of the book).
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This categorization is contentious at the margins.118 For example, when
a company funds or distributes favorable research published in peerreviewed science journals, the dissemination of the articles is usually
treated as non-commercial speech.119 But the Second Circuit has
suggested that a research publication theoretically could be actionable
false advertising if the authors fail to disclose industry compensation or
other conflicts of interest.120 The FDA guidelines permit drug companies
to distribute journal articles only if they are accompanied with a
comprehensive bibliography and copies of publications that reach
contrary results.121 But for our purposes we will set aside hard cases and
focus on communications that are clear advertisements.
Because false commercial speech receives no constitutional protection
whatsoever, the methods for determining whether a statement is “true”
have high stakes. True facts and opinions receive constitutional protection
with quite probing intermediate scrutiny while false claims can be banned
for any plausible rational basis. The job of identifying false facts has been
left up to regulators of every sort—federal agencies, local governments,
judges, and juries—without much comment from the Supreme Court.
Indeed, the Court has intentionally left some fluidity between these
categories of statements by recognizing that some statements phrased as
opinions (e.g., “I believe X”) can imply not only the fact that the speaker
holds the belief, but also certain unstated facts that would be necessary to
justify such a belief.122
Some of the rules limiting what commercial speakers can say are
designed to clear out verifiably false statements. For example, the FTC
118. Hard cases: City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 507 U.S. 410, 419–21 (1993)
(finding that a single document can contain both commercial and noncommercial parts); Bolger, 463
U.S. at 67 (pamphlet sent by mail by non-profit organization is commercial speech); Semco, Inc. v.
Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 112 (6th Cir. 1995) (article written for trade magazine classified as
commercial speech); Birthright v. Birthright, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1114, 1138 (D.N.J. 1993) (nonprofit
fundraising letter is commercial advertising); Nat’l Artists Mgmt. Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224,
1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (former employee’s negative commentary about employer can be commercial
speech).
119. See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 62 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated in
part sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
120. ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 498 (2d Cir. 2013).
121. Revised Draft Guidance for Industry on Distributing Scientific and Medical Publications on
Unapproved New Uses—Recommended Practices; Availability, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,793, 11,794–95
(Mar. 3, 2014).
122. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct.
1318, 1331–32 (2015) (discussing factual omissions that rendered a statement misleading in the firm’s
SEC filings); Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092 (1991); Rebecca Tushnet,
Running the Gamut from A to B, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1321–23 [hereinafter Tushnet, Running the
Gamut] (discussing false implied claims from technically true statements).
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filed complaints against Nordstrom, Bed Bath & Beyond, and a few other
retailers for labeling products “made from bamboo” when they were in
fact made from rayon.123 Another group of rules creates and enforces
certain terms of art like “gluten-free” or “recycled,” and restricts
statements that verifiably conflict with the definition.124 Each of these
regulate anti-knowledge. But commercial speakers can run afoul of the
law by making contested claims, too.
Regulators take varying tacks to control junk science within their
sector. On one end of the spectrum, federal securities law has been
interpreted in a way that largely avoids First Amendment turmoil. SEC
actions are limited for the most part to fraud and negligence based on
verifiably false statements. In areas of contested knowledge, firms are free
to promote the findings of research in a contested area that puts the firm
in good light. While a publicly traded firm can be sued for deceit by
misstating the findings of an empirical study, it will not be held liable for
accurately describing the results of a study that used objectionable
research methodology.125 Moreover, even when firms make an actionable
false statement, they have the opportunity to raise a “truth on the market”
defense by showing that a fulsome, truthful disclosure would not have
“significantly altered the total mix of information available to a reasonable
investor.”126
123. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Nordstrom, Bed Bath & Beyond, Backcountry.com, and
J.C. Penney to Pay Penalties Totaling $1.3 Million for Falsely Labeling Rayon Textiles as Made of
“Bamboo” (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/nordstrom-bedbath-beyond-backcountrycom-jc-penney-pay-penalties [https://perma.cc/YF3F-GNAS]. The firms
had used bamboo as a raw material, but this still violated the FTC’s guidance on bamboo fabric
labeling. See ‘Bamboo’ Fabrics, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0122bamboo-fabrics [https://perma.cc/V3Y3-3LT4].
124. Food Labeling; Gluten-Free Labeling of Foods, 78 Fed. Reg. 47,154 (Aug. 5, 2013) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101); Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,122
(Oct. 11, 2012) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260); see also Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of
“False” Is, supra note 21, at 248–52 (giving other examples of term-of-art meaning-making,
including “organic,” “Made in the U.S.A.,” and “dolphin-safe”).
125. In re Rigel Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 697 F.3d 869, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Adolor Corp.
Sec. Litig., 616 F. Supp. 2d 551, 568 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 2009); DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp., 149 F. Supp.
2d 1212, 1225 (S.D. Cal. 2001); Padnes v. Scios Nova Inc., No. C 95-1693 MHP, 1996 WL 539711
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1996). Moreover, liability also hinges on the plaintiff’s ability to show actual
reliance, causation, and economic loss. Rigel, 697 F.3d at 876. However, a firm can run afoul of SEC
law by failing to disclose studies—even studies that fail to achieve statistical significance—that
foretell serious risk of liability. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 38–44 (2011).
126. Rand v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 200, 206 (D. Mass. 1991); see also Raab v. Gen.
Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[P]resumption that the market price has internalized
all publicly available information cuts both ways.”); Pei v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir.
1986) (“[D]efendants are . . . free to assert appropriate defenses, including . . . that the market did not
respond to the misrepresentation.”).
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The very purpose of having and enforcing SEC disclosure laws is to
remove cheap talk from the securities market, so securities law could have
been fertile ground for regulating overly optimistic claims about contested
knowledge. But perhaps because securities are products that by their
nature require speculation, the law has taken a relatively restrained
approach to the determination of falsity.127
For other industries, peddlers’ scientific claims are policed more
heavily, and until recently the case law showed little of the anxiety about
state-determined truth in scientific debates that pervades the analysis of
other types of speakers. To the contrary, advertisements that are
“unsupported by accepted authority or research . . . may be deemed false
on their face and actionable” under the false advertising provisions of the
Lanham Act.128 Contested knowledge is therefore likely to be received as
“false or misleading” by regulators, and to fall outside the scope of First
Amendment protection.
The FDA and the FTC are particularly hostile to contested claims, in
part because the stakes of bad science are greatest in the realm of public
health. Both agencies set high and specific standards for the sort of
evidence that can substantiate a claim about the health benefits of
products. Any claim that is not supported with at least two randomized
controlled human trials falls outside the agencies’ standards for accepted
knowledge and is treated as false or misleading advertising.129 First
Amendment challenges to these regulations used to be rebuffed by the
courts, as we saw in the Egg Council case described in the Introduction.
Courts gave the FDA and the FTC wide latitude to define the meaning of
“misleading” and to manage health claims as the expert agencies thought
best. But recent, successful challenges suggest the era of agency discretion
is over.
In United States v. Caronia,130 the Second Circuit vacated the
conviction of a pharmaceutical representative.131 The drug rep had told
doctors (undercover agents, as it turned out) that a drug, Xyrem, which
was approved to treat only narcolepsy, could also be prescribed to patients

127. Alternatively, perhaps securities investors for even publicly traded securities are presumed to
be more sophisticated and alert than other consumers.
128. McNeil-PCC, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d Cir. 1991); ALPO
Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194, 213 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
129. See The Drug Development Process: Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405622.htm [https://perma.cc/TL3B-2Y2Z].
130. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
131. Id. at 152.
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suffering from insomnia and restless leg syndrome.132 On appeal, Caronia
argued that he had been convicted for his non-misleading speech. The
evidence supporting Caronia’s recommendations for off-label uses was
spotty, certainly falling short of the two clinical trials required for FDA
approval, but the FDA did not argue that Caronia’s statements were false.
Instead, the agency insisted that the First Amendment did not extend to
Caronia because his speech was used as mere evidence of conduct
(specifically, introducing a “misbranded” or “mislabeled” drug into the
market).133 The Second Circuit rejected the argument, pointing out that
the FDA had insisted throughout the case that speech alone was sufficient
to violate the criminal statute.134
The role of speech in product regulation is more complicated than the
Second Circuit suggests,135 but the court was right to find that the First
Amendment covered this case. The FDA’s position was always difficult
to defend because Caronia’s liability hinged on selling a “mislabeled” or
“misbranded” product rather than on some physical quality of the product.
Moreover, the cases that the FDA does not bring are telling. The FDA
does not enforce the mislabeling laws in the extremely common scenario
in which a drug is sold in large quantities for off-label purposes with the
knowledge of its manufacturers. Over 20% of prescriptions are written for
off-label purposes.136 For some populations, like children, most drugs are
prescribed and used off-label since children are rarely recruited into

132. Id. at 156. The drug rep also said the drug could be used for minors under age sixteen when
FDA approval was for patients sixteen and older. Id. at 157.
133. Id. at 160–61.
134. Id. at 161–62.
135. Chris Robertson has laid out more clearly than the FDA itself why speech can be used as
evidence of intent for a regulatory scheme that targets conduct or products as a whole. See Chris
Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment Right to Promote Drugs Off-Label, 78 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1019 (2017). Nevertheless, in this case, the FDA’s enforcement practices do not use speech
as mere evidence of intent. If that were the case, intent could be proved using non-speech evidence,
such as the fact that a large portion of sales are to consumers who will use the product for an off-label
purpose. The vitamin industry for all practical purposes intends to sell its wares for the prevention
and treatment of health conditions. Even FDA guidance clarifies that “intent” is used to mean—and
only mean—speech. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEMORANDUM: PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS
AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO MANUFACTURER COMMUNICATIONS
REGARDING UNAPPROVED USES OF APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL PRODUCTS 21–22 (2017)
[hereinafter FDA, PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT]; FDA, MOBILE MEDICAL
APPLICATIONS, supra note 105, at 10 (excluding from the scope of regulation “[m]anufacturers or
distributors of mobile platforms who solely distribute or market their platform and do not intend (by
marketing claims—e.g., labeling claims or advertising material) the platform to be used for medical
device functions”).
136. Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use: Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008).
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clinical trials. And for some specialties, off-label drugs account for the
majority of prescriptions.137
All of these common off-label prescribing patterns should give the
FDA ample evidence for mislabeling prosecutions since they show that
the manufacturer knew, expected, and desired for the drug to be used for
off-label purposes.138 Yet the FDA does not enforce the law against drug
manufacturers in these cases. To the contrary, the FDA recognizes that
off-label prescribing is a common and valuable practice.139 The FDA
never enforces the misbranding law unless the manufacturer uses
commercial speech to promote off-label uses.140 Since speech is not just a
sufficient condition but a necessary one, the theory that FDA misbranding
does not regulate speech is unacceptable.141 Caronia has exposed the
uncomfortable fact that much of the FDA’s work is geared toward
regulating information, not products.
Following Caronia, many commentators in the public health field
argued that any drug promotion advocating off-label use is inherently and
automatically misleading.142 The argument was explicitly considered and

137. Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions (and Their Answers) About Off-Label
Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 982, 983–85 (2012); Euni Lee et al., Off-Label Prescribing
Patterns of Antidepressants in Children and Adolescents, 21 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG
SAFETY 137, 137–38 (2012).
138. 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2017) (“Meaning of ‘intended uses’ . . . [objective intent] may be shown
by the circumstances that the article is, with the knowledge of such persons or their representatives,
offered and used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised. The intended uses of an
article may change after it has been introduced into interstate commerce by its manufacturer. . . . [I]f
a manufacturer knows, or has knowledge of facts that would give him notice, that a drug introduced
into interstate commerce by him is to be used for conditions, purposes, or uses other than the ones for
which he offers it, he is required to provide adequate labeling for such a drug which accords with such
other uses to which the article is to be put.”).
139. “The term ‘unapproved uses’ is, to some extent, misleading. It includes a variety of situations
ranging from unstudied to thoroughly investigated drug uses. . . . [A]ccepted medical practice often
includes drug use that is not reflected in approved drug labeling. With respect to its role in medical
practice, the package insert is informational only.” Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications,
FDA DRUG BULL., Apr. 1982, at 4, 5 (1982) (emphasis added). Moreover, although the FDA and the
states could ban the prescribing of drugs for off-label uses, they have done so only for a few drugs.
21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (2012) (banning the off-label distribution of human growth hormone); Greene
& Noah, supra note 21, at 262–63.
140. FDA, PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 135, at 21–22
(describing promotion as the key to the FDA’s interpretation of “intent” to introduce an unapproved
or misbranded medical product).
141. For a similar critique of attempts to regulate speech through corporate governance regulations,
see Larry E. Ribstein, First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019,
1022 (2011).
142. Greene & Noah, supra note 21, at 257.
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rejected in Caronia143 and well before,144 because the FDA itself
acknowledges that “off-label uses or treatment regimens may be
important and may even constitute a medically recognized standard of
care.”145 And in a subsequent case, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA,146 the
FDA was forced to acknowledge that at least some off-label promotion
was not misleading.147 In Amarin’s case, the drug manufacturer wished to
promote off-label uses that the FDA itself had researched and publicly
recommended.148
But neither Caronia nor Amarin provided clear guidance on how the
First Amendment constrains the standards the government can use to
regulate contested claims.149 Rather than setting general principles, the
Amarin court itself reviewed and revised the contested statements about
off-label uses. The court concluded that commercial speech reporting
scientific findings must be “studiously neutral” in order to avoid being
misleading (and thus unprotected), and it hand-crafted statements that
Amarin could use in order to meet this exacting standard.150
POM Wonderful v. Federal Trade Commission151 raised more directly
the First Amendment’s constraints on agency standards for truth (in this
case, the FTC’s). POM Wonderful had designed an advertising campaign

143. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2012).
144. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Greene & Noah, supra note
21, at 261.
145. Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or
Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or
Cleared Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 2009), https://www.fda.gov/Regulatory
Information/Guidances/ucm125126.htm [https://perma.cc/3TNE-Y7C6].
146. 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
147. See id. at 227.
148. Id. at 209–11, 229. The case involved the drug Vascepa, which had been approved to treat
some cardiovascular conditions, but which many studies (including an FDA-funded study) had shown
was effective for treating other heart conditions. Id. at 209. Although the studies did not conform to
the strict requirements for FDA approval of a new use of an existing drug, see id. at 203–05, promotion
for these off-label uses was presumed by the court to be truthful and non-misleading, id. at 198. The
FDA maintained, however, that disclosures could be misleading by failing to communicate the
limitations of the study. Id. at 216.
149. See id. at 228 (noting that the Caronia decision is limited to truthful and non-misleading
speech).
150. Id. (“one-sided”); id. at 230 (“studiously neutral”); id. at 232–33 (showing that the court is
hand-crafting such a studiously neutral statement for the parties). The court described its methods as
“err[ing] on the side of caution.” Id. at 233.
151. 777 F.3d 478 (2015).
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around weak evidence that pomegranate juice reduces heart disease,
prostate cancer, and erectile dysfunction, among other things.152
Figure 4:
POM Wonderful “Cheat Death” Advertisement153

152. Id. at 484. Some of the advertisements misreported results from studies. Id. at 487. Because
these ads make false observational claims, they do not raise the more interesting epistemological
questions about speculative claims, so I will put them aside for this discussion.
153. POM Figures Appendix (Appendix B) at fig.7, In re POM Wonderful LLC, 155 F.T.C. 1
(2013) (No. D-9344), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/ 130116pom
appendixb.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC7X-89QN].
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The FTC filed a complaint because the statements had not been
substantiated using two randomized controlled human clinical trials,
which the FTC required in order for food advertising to make a nonmisleading health claim.154 The D.C. Circuit found that the FTC’s
standard for non-misleading statements was too onerous, finding that one
randomized trial would be enough. POM Wonderful had only
observational studies rather than experimental trials,155 so the FTC won
the case, but at the price of lost control over the meaning of
“misleading.”156
These judicial developments are fraught with controversy because the
stakes seem very high. On one hand, loosening agency grip over
advertising and promotion could amplify a lot of junk science. One study
that looked at a sample of statements supporting off-label use of drugs
found that only 27% of them were supported by strong scientific
evidence.157 If courts protect claims that have a weaker scientific basis, it
could affect consumers and patients in unpredictable ways.
On the other hand, the standards that currently apply to commercial
speakers regulated by the FDA and FTC even after Amarin and POM
Wonderful are very demanding. A drug manufacturer cannot place an
advertisement in a medical journal that accurately describes the results of
a high quality scientific study without significant risk. 158 The standards
for drug promotion are higher than those that apply to doctors, who are
held to a forgiving industry custom standard and often report the results
154. Id. Note that the FTC and FDA share authority over the regulation of food. Through a
memorandum of understanding, they have divided the labor by having the FTC regulate claims made
in advertising and having the FDA regulate the labeling of food. Memorandum of Understanding
Between Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,539
(Sept. 16, 1971).
155. Moreover, the observational studies conflicted with a controlled experiment that resulted in
no pomegranate juice effect.
156. On the other hand, the POM case seems to be less protective than a previous case decided by
the same circuit that found the FDA could not ban any health claim consistent with the First
Amendment if the “evidence in support of the claim is qualitatively weaker than evidence against the
claim.” Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 659 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original). The
district court then further elaborated that a claim cannot be banned if there was any “credible
evidence” supporting it unless that evidence was “outweighed by evidence against the claim” or was
“qualitatively weaker.” Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 114–15 (D.D.C. 2001); see also
Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F.Supp.2d 1, 9–13 (D.D.C. 2002) (analyzing the weight of the available
evidence, finding that the support was mixed, and concluding that the FDA’s outright rejection of a
claim was not constitutionally permissible).
157. David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 121, 123 (2006).
158. Greene & Noah, supra note 21, at 266.
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of non-rigorous studies to their patients.159 Indeed, in some areas, the
standard of care to which a doctor must conform is based on scientific
evidence that falls short of the FDA’s and FTC’s standards for food and
drug promotion.160 But this may be defensible; advertising is never strictly
necessary whereas doctors have to give opinions and advice even when
there is very little reliable research.
Even if expert federal agencies are making the best possible tradeoffs
between information flows and consumer protection (which in the next
Part I will argue they do not), the expert agencies are not the only source
of commercial speech restrictions. Federal and state courts decide false
advertising claims brought by competitors and consumers, meaning that
judges and juries must assess whether a statement is false. Faith in
regulator expertise may be misplaced in these cases.161
The constitutionality of false advertising law was challenged recently
in Eastman Chemical Co. v. Plastipure.162 Eastman brought a Lanham Act
claim for false advertising against Plastipure for promoting the results of
a study published in a peer-reviewed journal of the National Institutes of
Health.163 The study was authored by the company’s founder, a professor
of neurobiology at the University of Texas. The study had tested several
plastic resins for evidence of risk of estrogenic activity caused by
chemicals used in plastics like bisphenol-A (BPA).164 Some of the
products that produced evidence of estrogenic activity were made with
Tritan, a resin manufactured by the Eastman Chemical Company.
Plastipure sent out brochures touting the findings. The only difference
between the conclusions of the journal article and the description in the
promotional material was that the brochure identified Eastman’s Tritan
products by name.165 Eastman sued Plastipure, and a jury (using a

159. See discussion supra section II.D.
160. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9–15, Par Pharm., Inc. v. United States,
No. 1:11-cv-01820 (D.D.C. 2011); Luke Dawson, A Spoonful of Free Speech Helps the Medicine Go
Down: Off-Label Speech & the First Amendment, 99 IOWA L. REV. 803 (2014).
161. For example, in Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (S.D. Fla. 2007), a district court
refused to dismiss a false advertising claim brought against the maker of Lipitor for advertising the
drug not only for the FDA-approved purpose of lowering cholesterol but also for reducing the risk of
heart disease. Shortly after the order, the FDA did approve Lipitor for the treatment of heart disease.
So, Pfizer was exposed to liability for statements that were true under the FDA’s high standards for
drug approval.
162. 775 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2014).
163. Id. at 233–34.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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preponderance of the evidence standard) found that the claims made in the
promotional materials, and hence in the scientific study, were false.166
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied an “especially deferential” standard
of review to jury findings in the Lanham Act case.167 “Advertisements,”
the court explained, “do not become immune from Lanham Act scrutiny
simply because their claims are open to scientific or public debate.”168
The Lanham Act poses significant risk to any company wishing to
advertise using research results because highly motivated competitors can
bring false advertising claims based on any alleged methodological
flaw.169 One strand of the “false by necessary implication” doctrine holds
that any statement that misstates the scope of a study’s valid implications
is automatically “literally false” within the meaning of the Lanham Act.170
The courts’ inconsistent deference to fact-finders in determining the
standard for non-misleading speech has left the bounds of commercial
speech doctrine in disarray. Peddlers are much better protected when they
use puffery than when they use contested factual claims.
F.

The Public Authority

The least protected speaker of all is the public authority—one who
speaks on behalf of the government. The First Amendment protects the
interests of the governed, not the state, so government entities can put
limits on their own speech.171
The government can forbid itself from making false statements of fact,
and on rare occasions it has done so.172 But when it comes to contested

166. Id. at 234.
167. Id. at 238 (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 236.
169. Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is, supra note 21, at 102 (describing
murkiness between true and false).
170. Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1993); Church & Dwight Co. v. Clorox
Co., 840 F. Supp. 2d 717, 721 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). However, unlike FTC actions, Lanham Act plaintiffs
must still prove consumer deception and harm. Tushnet, Running the Gamut, supra 122, at 1339.
171. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (“The First Amendment protects the press from governmental interference; it confers no
analogous protection on the Government.”). Note that this is distinguishable from the Government
Speech Doctrine, which holds that the First Amendment rights of constituents does not require the
government to take viewpoint neutral stances in the government’s own speech. Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991).
172. For an example of such a constraint, see Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)
(requiring the maintenance of truthful information); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(requiring accurate disclosures/reproductions of government records).
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knowledge, governments have declined to limit themselves the way they
limit professional and commercial speakers.
Examples of the government’s mischaracterization of science abound.
At the executive level, President George W. Bush tampered with agency
reports in order to inject more ambiguity into the research verifying global
temperature increases than was warranted.173 President Barack Obama’s
report on campus sexual assault states that one in five women is sexually
assaulted in college,174 when the figure is nearly impossible to measure
with confidence and might be closer to one in fifty if “assault” is defined
narrowly.175 And the Trump administration made up entire terrorist
massacres within its first three weeks in power.176
Federal agencies are also responsible for spreading misinformation.177
Given the nature of its work, it is not surprising that the FDA often makes
health claims that are later debunked as more evidence accumulates. But
the FDA does not have a great track record for responding to new evidence
quickly.
For example, there is only scant evidence that salt consumption is bad
for health.178 Nevertheless, the FDA maintains rules to encourage foods
173. Distorting and Suppressing Climate Change Research, SCI. INTEGRITY POLICYMAKING,
http://www.webexhibits.org/bush/5.html [https://perma.cc/3832-A8Q5].
174. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS, WHITE HOUSE, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT:
A RENEWED CALL TO ACTION 1 (2014).
175. Alia Wong, Why the Prevalence of Campus Sexual Assault Is So Hard to Quantify, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/01/why-the-prevalence-ofcampus-sexual-assault-is-so-hard-to-quantify/427002/ [https://perma.cc/UVF5-L65R].
176. See Aaron Blake, Kellyanne Conway’s ‘Bowling Green Massacre’ Wasn’t a Slip of the
Tongue. She Has Said It Before., WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2017/02/06/kellyanne-conways-bowling-green-massacre-wasnt-a-slip-of-the-tongueshes-said-it-before/?utm_term=.4096e115b261 [https://perma.cc/ACK7-GG5U]. For a more
comprehensive list of the Trump Administration’s false claims, see David Leonhardt & Stuart A.
Thompson, Trump’s Lies, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/
06/23/opinion/trumps-lies.html [https://perma.cc/8QK6-LQUL].
177. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency had to remove saccharine from its list of
carcinogens. Scott Hensley, Saccharin Sweet Now Comes Without Hazardous Baggage, NPR (Dec.
15, 2010, 2:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2010/12/15/132078283/saccharinsweet-now-comes-without-hazardous-baggage [https://perma.cc/3SJ7-4Z6L].
178. INST. OF MED., SODIUM INTAKE IN POPULATIONS: ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE (2013). In fact,
the dietary recommendations of the federal government may pose health risks from too little salt.
Margin O’Donnell et al., Urinary Sodium and Potassium Excretion, Mortality, and Cardiovascular
Events, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 612 (2014). The original research implicating salt as a contributor to
heart disease was based on low-quality methodologies that compared salt consumption and heart
health patterns at the nation-state level. Melinda Wenner Moyer, It’s Time to End the War on Salt,
SCI. AM. (July 8, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/its-time-to-end-the-war-on-salt/
[https://perma.cc/5RSY-9SWM]. Suzanne Oparil, former president of the American Heart
Association, explained “[t]he current [salt] guidelines are based on almost nothing.” Peter Whoriskey,
Is the American Diet Too Salty? Scientists Challenge the Longstanding Government Warning, WASH.
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to label themselves as “low sodium” even though the designation is likely
to steer consumers to foods that taste worse without offering any health
advantages.179
The federal agencies’ information campaigns on dietary cholesterol are
similarly flawed. Recall from the Introduction that the FTC inferred from
studies identifying blood cholesterol as a culprit for cardiovascular
problems that foods containing cholesterol must increase cholesterol
levels in the bloodstream. Using the Lanham Act’s false by necessary
implication doctrine, the FTC’s position on dietary cholesterol would be
considered “literally false” since it extrapolated a conclusion beyond what
was demonstrated by the empirical studies.180 Since the In re National
Commission on Egg Nutrition181 case, the link between dietary cholesterol
and blood cholesterol has been seriously undermined,182 yet the FDA has
held tight to the old position against cholesterol. It has failed to change
the mandatory nutrition panel (which mandates reporting of dietary
cholesterol) and it continues to peg terms like “lean” in its labeling
guidelines to low dietary cholesterol.183
The FDA will also have to modernize its stance against fat in all forms.
For decades, the agency has allowed low-fat, nutrition-poor foods like
Snackwell cookies to parade as “healthy” while denying nut-packed
competitor snacks the opportunity to use that word on their packaging.184
The FDA’s sluggishness to reflect the current state of knowledge is
striking because the agency would not accept a comparable lag from the
food and drug producers it regulates.
POST (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/06/more-scientistsdoubt-salt-is-as-bad-for-you-as-the-government-says/?utm_term=.4df06b5355d6 [https://perma.cc/
KCX9-98YB].
179. 21 C.F.R. § 101.61 (2017).
180. See discussion supra Introduction.
181. 88 F.T.C. 89 (1976), enforced in part, Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157
(7th Cir. 1977).
182. Other agencies have finally responded to the current state of research. The federal “Dietary
Guidelines” for 2015–2020 have eliminated dietary cholesterol as a food to avoid. U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2015–2020 DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR
AMERICANS 32 (8th ed. 2015), https://health.gov/dietaryguidelines/2015/resources/2015-2020_
Dietary_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB4D-9LRS].
183. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A FOOD LABELING GUIDE: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY 92 (2013), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/UCM265446.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MQ4-GQMJ].
184. The FDA’s enforcement against KIND bars shows the folly in their current definition of
“healthy” (which largely excludes foods that have nuts). Chris Weller, FDA Criticizes KIND Snacks
over False Health Claims, Names Saturated Fats as Culprit, MED. DAILY (Apr. 15, 2015, 10:13 AM),
http://www.medicaldaily.com/fda-criticizes-kind-snacks-over-false-health-claims-names-saturatedfats-culprit-329316 [https://perma.cc/4PBR-9J6B].
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Federal statutory law and its supporting regulations can also convey
misleading information about the state of scientific knowledge. For
example, under the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana is classified as
a Schedule I drug for which there is “no currently accepted medical
use”185—even though there have been a number of well-controlled studies
published in the top medical journals showing the efficacy of marijuana
for the treatment of nausea, pain, and the symptoms of multiple
sclerosis.186
State lawmakers create a crazy quilt of scientific misinformation. Some
make unsupported statements about fetal pain in the preambles to
abortion-restriction legislation.187 Others require food producers to label
genetically modified organisms, perpetuating the myth that they carry
additional health risks.188 Still others actively promote quackery by

185. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
186. See, e.g., D.I. Abrams et al., Cannabis in Painful HIV-Associated Sensory Neuropathy: A
Randomized Placebo-Controlled Trial, 68 NEUROLOGY 515 (2007); Jody Corey-Bloom et al., Smoked
Cannabis for Spasticity in Multiple Sclerosis: A Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Trial, CANADIAN
MED. ASS’N J., July 10, 2012; Ronald J. Ellis et al., Smoked Medicinal Cannabis for Neuropathic
Pain in HIV: A Randomized, Crossover Clinical Trial, 34 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 672
(2009); Penny F. Whiting et al., Cannabinoids for Medical Use: A Systematic Review and MetaAnalysis, 313 JAMA 2456 (2015).
187. Seventeen states have banned abortion after twenty weeks of gestation on the grounds that the
fetus is able to feel pain at or before twenty weeks, yet this position is inconsistent with the medical
consensus that pain cannot be felt prior to the formation of the cortex, which begins at the twentysixth week at the earliest. See State Policies on Later Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions
[https://perma.cc/
7FMW-HLL2] (last updated Feb. 1, 2018). For a description of the consensus that pain can be felt at
twenty-six weeks at the earliest, see John A. Robertson, Science Disputes in Abortion Law, 93 TEX.
L. REV. 1849 (2015).
188. Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” 58
ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 463 (2016) (“Vermont’s Act 120 requires the ‘clear and conspicuous’ labeling of
all food intended for human consumption ‘produced entirely or in part from genetic engineering.’ In
enacting this requirement, the Vermont legislature declared that such foods ‘potentially pose risks to
health, safety, agriculture, and the environment,’ citing an alleged ‘lack of consensus regarding the
validity of the research and science surrounding the safety of genetically engineered foods.’”) In fact,
after diligent searching by many researchers, there is no evidence that genetic modification poses
risks. The closest the evidence comes to showing any danger from GMO foods are studies on
Roundup-Ready GMO crops that could indirectly cause harm by increasing the use of Roundup
pesticides instead of alternatives. However, even the best studies on the health effects of Roundup
require extrapolation from tests on rats and human placentas, and they fail to provide a comparison
to other chemicals and mechanisms that would be used in lieu of Roundup. See, e.g., N. Benachour
et al., Time- and Dose-Dependent Effects of Roundup on Human Embryonic and Placental Cells, 53
ARCHIVES ENVTL. CONTAMINATION & TOXICOLOGY 126 (2007). At one time the FDA had even
considered the voluntary labeling of foods as “non-GMO” to be potentially misleading. See U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
VOLUNTARY LABELING INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED
USING BIOENGINEERING: DRAFT GUIDANCE (2001).
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forming state-run licensing boards for fortune-tellers and practitioners of
holistic medicine.189
Many scholars have criticized the Supreme Court precedent’s
simplistic approach to government speech.190 For the very reasons that
free speech doctrine has constrained the government from attempting to
resolve scientific disputes in the public discourse, good policy (if not the
First Amendment itself) should arguably keep the government from
polluting public discourse with anti-knowledge and weakly supported
contested knowledge.191
For the purposes of this Article, though, the government’s promotion
of flawed science is more important in comparative than absolute terms.
The government has the resources and opportunity to be an influential
speaker. If it places no requirements to substantiate its own speculative
claims with credible scientific studies, then the state’s interest in screening
out unsubstantiated claims of other speakers is demonstrably weak.
This is principally a normative critique rather than a constitutional one.
However, to the extent a speaker receives any First Amendment
protection (which all but commercial speakers automatically do), the
critique can buttress a constitutional challenge. One California district
court used precisely this comparative reasoning in striking down a

189. See License Application Form for Fortune-Telling in Mesa, AZ, http://www.mesaaz.gov/
home/showdocument?id=4972 [https://perma.cc/3M4P-ZDQ4]; John M. Glionna, Fortuneteller
License Law Called Biased, L.A. TIMES (July 21, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jul/21/local/
me-fortune21 [https://perma.cc/DKP6-94Y9]; CAL. DEPT. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS: NATUROPATHIC
MEDICINE COMMITTEE, http://www.naturopathic.ca.gov [https://perma.cc/YRL2-X7CY].
190. Jess Alderman, Words to Live By: Public Health, the First Amendment, and Government
Speech, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 161, 170–74 (2009); Jeffrey M. Cohen, The Right to Learn: Intellectual
Honesty and the First Amendment, 39 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 659, 659 (2012) (deceit in public
education); David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 703 (1992); David Fagundes, State Actors as
First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1637, 1638 (2006); Abner S. Greene, Government of
the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35–37 (2000); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s Implied
Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104, 1104 (1979); Helen Norton, The
Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73, 100 (2015) (noting, among other things, that
government lies can impede democratic self-determination).
191. In extreme cases, a government actor’s claims can be a form of soft censorship by intimidating
other speakers. For example, in a particularly ironic example, an Idaho prosecutor told his constituents
that “the spread of false information or inflammatory or threatening statements . . . may violate
federal law” when of course such statements are in most cases constitutionally protected. Eugene
Volokh, Opinion, Chief Idaho Federal Prosecutor Warns: “The Spread of False Information or
Inflammatory or Threatening Statements . . . May Violate Federal Law,” WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/
06/26/chief-idaho-federal-prosecutor-warns-the-spread-of-false-information-or-inflammatory-orthreatening-statements-may-violate-federal-law/?utm_term=.5f999b7b1cbe [https://perma.cc/BKF5PCDC].
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regulation on pricing information that exempted the government from the
rule, asking, “[i]f this speech is so deceptive and harmful, why is the
government allowed to engage in it?”192
G.

Synthesis

This elaborate tour through the state of law for factual claims can now
yield its payoffs.
In the public discourse, because courts are understandably reluctant to
decide what the “truth” is, all factual claims are protected with something
approaching complete immunity except for the historically unprotected
categories of lies like defamation and fraud. The listener, rather than the
government, has both the right and the responsibility to weed out bad
claims and decide what is correct. Outside public discourse, however, the
government has a freer hand. It can use the latitude to clear out antiknowledge and many contested claims as well.
This hybrid structure combines the benefits of two very different styles
of truth-seeking: a free-for-all (press, politicians, public authority) and an
expert approach (protectors, peddlers). The free-for-all ensures that
nothing that might be true is rejected. The expert approach ensures that
only the claims that are likely to be true are accepted.193
Given that free speech law uses these two distinct and often
contradictory models, the categorization of speakers into these models
makes intuitive sense. For example, the expert model seems entirely
appropriate for the protector category since the clients will relinquish their
own efforts and independent judgments about the relevant scientific
debates. Because the listener has a preference for avoiding junk science
as demonstrated by his seeking out an expert advisor, the free-for-all
model is a mismatch. It likewise makes intuitive sense that other private
speakers might have more legal impositions if, in context, the listener will
be dependent on them for information (as with a landowner and a visitor).
Commercial speakers, however, are a misfit. Advertisers address the
public through the same media as the press and politicians, yet when one
message (“pomegranate juice reduces heart attacks”) is paired with
another (“so buy my pomegranate juice”), the statement shifts from
192. Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing City of Ladue
v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994), for the proposition that exemptions from an otherwise legitimate
regulation of speech could diminish the credibility of the government’s interest for regulating the
speech in the first place), aff’d sub nom. Italian Colors Rest. v. Becerra, 878 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2018).
193. This is quite consistent with Robert Post’s argument that information law is designed to do
two mutually inconsistent things depending on context: encourage democratic participation or foster
the development of expertise. See generally ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND
ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012).
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maximally protected to wholly unprotected. The self-interested
motivations of commercial speakers can partly explain why a free-for-all
model would frustrate the pursuit of truth. Regulations of advertising use
an expansive version of falsity in which all contested claims are
vulnerable.
Moreover, falsity is often treated as a harm in itself. Lack of proper
substantiation is sufficient on its own for commercial speakers to run afoul
of the law, and when First Amendment challenges are brought, the courts,
too, focus only on the validity of the government’s assessment of truth
without analyzing the risks of a possible falsehood.194
Of course, falsity is related to risk, but it is no substitute. The
relationship between falsity and risk is not strong enough to bear the full
weight of today’s speech rules, especially since contested knowledge
comes with a broad range of evidentiary support. Many of the commercial
claims that are screened out by modern advertising laws have a good
chance of being true, and in some cases, the harm even if they are false is
quite limited. Meanwhile, the free-for-all model for public discourse goes
too far by preserving any remote chance that poorly substantiated speech
may turn out to be true. Risk-centered free speech law would permit some
claims in public discourse to be subjected to government restrictions even
though we know, ex ante, that there is always a chance they may be true.
Free speech doctrine can be readjusted to use risk, rather than falsity,
as the basis for non-protection of scientific opinion. The next Part explains
why today’s truth-oriented free speech doctrine does a poor job tracking
risk, particularly for the press and the peddlers—the most loved and most
loathed speakers. Part IV will then show how free speech doctrine can be
tweaked to balance speech interests against risk.
III. PROBLEMS
The First Amendment provides formidable, but qualified, protection to
speakers. Risk, particularly physical risk, is an entirely appropriate
counterweight to the heavy constitutional commitment to free speech.
Unfortunately, the emphasis on falsity has caused First Amendment
doctrine to drift apart from a risk analysis in some respects.
The doctrine under-protects commercial speakers by treating all factual
claims that lack a high level of substantiation as false (or, at least
potentially false) and unprotected. This treatment is not in line with a risk
assessment because sometimes the consequences of censorship if a
194. Sometimes giving great deference to the government’s assessment, as in In re National
Committee on Egg Nutrition, and sometimes imposing limits on the government’s assessment, as in
POM Wonderful. See supra section II.E.
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statement turns out to be true are much greater than the consequences if a
statement is false. The risks are not symmetric.
At the same time, First Amendment doctrine overprotects speakers in
the public discourse by shielding anti-knowledge from regulation no
matter how foreseeable ensuing harm may be. This, too, is explained by
the courts’ nearsighted focus on truth. Since statements even within the
anti-knowledge category have a chance of being true despite the body of
persuasive evidence running against them, First Amendment precedent
has guarded that moonshot chance. But this deprives the public of
protection against foreseeable risks and culpable inflictions of harm that
should be able to withstand strict scrutiny.
This Part explores the problems caused by truth-centered free speech
law for commercial speakers and public discourse.
A.

Truth and Commercial Speech

The Supreme Court has found it harder and harder to maintain the
lower status of commercial speech in a way that is consistent with its
essentially libertarian approach to free speech,195 but at the same time, it
would be foolish to pretend that advertising is equivalent to broader public
discourse. Advertisers are not the only speakers who have self-serving
motivations, but they always have self-serving motivations.196 Peddlers
will find, produce, and share scientific evidence of any quality that helps
the bottom line.
Constitutional precedent sensibly leaves more room for regulating
misleading advertising claims than other types of speech.197 But the selfinterest of commercial speakers does not necessarily conflict with the
goals of consumers or even of scientific progress. Advertising may be a
danger when factual claims happen to be wrong, but it is an unmatched
educator when the claims happen to be right. And in the meantime, while

195. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565 (2011) (treating the statute as viewpoint
discrimination instead of commercial speech regulation).
196. See generally Joanna K. Sax, Protecting Scientific Integrity: The Commercial Speech
Doctrine Applied to Industry Publications, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 203 (2011) (describing bias in
corporate-funded research and reporting of results). Regulators may also worry about the harms from
fly-by-night commercial operations that willingly promote a good or service on a false premise only
to go bankrupt or leave the jurisdiction before harm can be identified and redressed.
197. In other words, I largely agree with Rebecca Tushnet’s argument that commercial speech and
consumer speech about corporations deserve different First Amendment treatment. Tushnet, Fighting
Freestyle, supra note 32, at 1458.
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scientific evidence is in dispute, advertising can be an instigator, drawing
more attention and research to the area.198
The FDA and FTC apply very stringent standards on advertising,
requiring substantiation consistent with the standards for scientific peerreviewed journals in order for a commercial claim to be considered nonmisleading.199 Private causes of action based on false advertising and
unfair competition use less defined and more uncertain standards,
allowing recovery to a plaintiff based on a mere preponderance of
evidence.200 And compliance with the FDA’s guidelines for advertising
does not provide a safe harbor in these private lawsuits.201 In all cases, the
agency and statutory rules regulate speech based on truth rather than risk.
In fact, the FDA has explicitly rejected the recommendation to use risk as
the basis for regulating speech.202 And false advertising claims can be
brought “without reference to the advertisement’s impact on the buying
public.”203
These standards have deleterious effects. First, poorly substantiated
factual claims may be more valuable to consumers than the alternative: no
factual claims at all. Second, commercial regulations can induce too much
confidence in the claims that are sufficiently substantiated. And third,
overly high standards for truth can sap the incentives for producers to
conduct research and for consumers to demand more evidence. Each
problem is considered in turn.
1.

Restricting Good Information

False advertising law uses very high standards for substantiation. The
FTC and the FDA require health claims to be supported with two
randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Courts interpreting the Lanham Act
have penalized advertisers for relying on independent studies that do not
precisely match their claims, even when the studies are the best available

198. Which may or may not be a good thing, depending on where that effort would have gone
otherwise.
199. See supra section II.E for a full description.
200. Moreover, plaintiffs demanding censorship may have an advantage because they present their
cases first and capitalize on the “primacy effect” since juries’ understanding of the case and the
strength of evidence favors the evidence that is presented first. See Mark Spottswood, Ordering Proof:
Beyond Adversarial and Inquisitorial Trial Structures, 83 TENN. L. REV. 291, 293–94 (2015).
201. POM Wonderful, LLC v. Coca Cola Co., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2233 (2014).
202. FDA, PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 135, at 28 (rejecting a
risk-based approach to drug regulation).
203. McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

06 - Bambauer.docx (Do Not Delete)

120

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/18/2018 4:51 PM

[Vol. 93:73

evidence on the topic.204 (U.S. regulators are not alone; the European
Union has banned claims that bottled water can prevent dehydration due
to lack of substantiation.205)
High standards for truth screen out valuable information. Stringent
standards, like placebo controls and double-blind experiments, are
appropriate for studies published in scientific journals, but consumers in
the real world need information more quickly than can be produced under
such demanding standards. Providing some information is usually in
consumers’ best interest, even if the data would not satisfy rigorous
scientific standards. At a critical point in time, information that makes for
lousy science is usually better than no information at all.206
The current high standards are premised on two assumptions. First, by
removing less substantiated claims from marketing, consumers will have
to use better information from other sources.207 And second, the high
standards will prompt companies to invest resources into running two
RCTs in order to meet the substantiation requirements.208 Neither
assumption is well founded. Generally speaking, no firms will invest the
resources required to perform RCTs unless they hold a patent or some
other form of exclusive control over a product. And as for the information
that consumers will use when less-substantiated advertising is brushed
away, better information may not exist. Even if it does exist, consumers
may not search for it.
Put in economic terms, for most products,209 the marginal utility of
advertising is likely to be positive if regulators reduce the requirements
for substantiation. This is true only because the standards we have are so
high. With a low enough standard of substantiation, consumers would be
better off by raising the standard so that it screens out the weakest claims.

204. See, e.g., McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d Cir.
1991).
205. Nadia Arumugam, EU Bans Bottled Water Claim that Water Prevents Dehydration:
Ludicrous or Just?, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2011, 1:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nadiaarumugam/
2011/12/01/eu-bans-bottled-water-claim-that-water-prevents-dehydration-ludicrous-orjust/#12c57ff152d9 [https://perma.cc/3ACT-8GJJ].
206. This is the point that Fred Schauer makes when he asks whether bad science can be good
evidence. See generally Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie
Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191 (2010).
207. See FDA, PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 133, at 6 (framing
as avoiding indirect harms from directing attention away from better products, presumably where the
better information would have steered them).
208. See id. at 4.
209. See my discussion of drug off-label promotion, infra Part IV, for an example where the current
standards may be appropriate.
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But the inflection point where the standard switches from being too
onerous to too weak is below the rules in place today.
Let’s focus on the randomized controlled trial for a moment. RCTs are
experiments that randomly assign a treatment (e.g., pomegranate juice) or
a control (e.g., a placebo juice that resembles pomegranate juice) to each
subject, and then measure a range of outcomes to investigate the effects.210
RCTs are rightly regarded as the gold standard for empirical evidence
because other factors that might explain a good outcome should be
controlled by the control group.211 This makes them much more powerful
than observational evidence because a person’s choice to drink
pomegranate juice out in the real world is not at all random and can be
influenced by preexisting health, socioeconomic status, demographics,
and other things. But nobody can or should rely on RCTs alone to
understand how the world works. Even if RCTs are well run,212 they are
often impossible to perform. We will never randomly assign experimental
treatments to babies or pregnant women unless they have a health
condition that is already threatening their lives.
By using RCTs as the sole acceptable standard, the FDA and the FTC
have guaranteed that many scientific debates cannot be discussed in
advertising because most studies use observations from the real world
rather than an experiment. Andrew Gelman explains the problem like this:
“[g]iven the manifest virtues of experiments, why do I almost always
analyze observational data? The short answer is that almost all the data
out there are observational.”213
Standard-setting has bedeviled the expert agencies for decades. The
FTC and the FDA sparred over the problem in the 1980s, when the FTC
supported the Kellogg company for making ads promoting high-fiber
cereals for health in violation of FDA regulations. Howard Beales and his
coauthors have summarized the episode:
Consider, for example, the Kellogg claim about the relationship
between diets high in fiber and the risk of colon cancer. Although
the FDA now believes that there is “substantial scientific
agreement” that the claim is correct, uncertainty remains. There
are, after all, no randomized clinical trials measuring the
incidence of cancer at different levels of fiber intake, and such
210. See Randomized Control Trial (RCT), PUBMED HEALTH, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmedhealth/PMHT0025811/ [https://perma.cc/EV2U-REBM].
211. Id.; see also Andrew Gelman, Experimental Reasoning in Social Science, in FIELD
EXPERIMENTS AND THEIR CRITICS: ESSAYS ON THE USES AND ABUSES OF EXPERIMENTATION IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 185 (Dawn Langan Teele ed., 2014).
212. The next subsection explains why they often are not well designed.
213. Gelman, supra note 211, at 192–93.
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trials would surely increase our confidence in the truth of the
claim. If the claim is true, however, waiting for the results of such
trials would impose substantial costs on consumers, who would
lose an important source of information about the likely
relationship between fiber consumption and cancer risk. Before
such claims were allowed, consumers ate less fiber, and as a result
incurred a higher risk of cancer than necessary. On the other hand,
if the claim turns out to be false, the consequences to consumers
are relatively small. They may give up the better taste of another
cereal, or pay a little more for a higher-fiber product. It seems
clear that, in this case, the far more serious error is mistakenly to
prohibit truthful claims.214
Identical reasoning can be applied to the POM Wonderful case; the
harm from consuming pomegranate juice, particularly if it substitutes for
some other juice or soda beverage, is negligible, so even weak evidence
of benefit should be brought to consumers’ attention. But this sort of
marginal analysis has fallen out of favor, and the FTC has, over time,
raised its standards to conform to the FDA.215
In addition to screening out positive information, the FDA standards
have also interfered with advertising that can enlighten the public about
the dangers of unhealthy products even if the claims are not technically
accurate. Consumption of fats and saturated fats dropped precipitously
between 1985 and 1990, during a period when a growing proportion of
food advertisements used health claims (most often, claims that linked
saturated fat to heart disease and then proudly boasted that the product
214. J. Howard Beales III et al., In Defense of the Pfizer Factors, in THE REGULATORY
REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: A THIRTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION 83, 90 (James Campbell Cooper ed., 2013). See generally PAULINE M. IPPOLITO & ALAN
D. MATHIOS, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, HEALTH CLAIMS IN ADVERTISING AND LABELING: A STUDY
OF THE CEREAL MARKET (1989), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/healthclaims-advertising-and-labeling-study-cereal-market/232187.pdf [https://perma.cc/N47L-GKT9] (a
study showing that when an advertising ban on the health benefits of fiber in cereal was lifted,
consumers and producers shifted their habits to incorporate more fiber); Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan
D. Mathios, Information, Advertising and Health Choices: A Study of the Cereal Market, 21 RAND
J. ECON. 459 (1990) (same).
215. Another way to understand how high the FDA and FTC standards are, consider as a
comparison what the government itself must have in terms of an empirical basis in order to meet First
Amendment strict scrutiny review:
We do not, however, require that “empirical data come . . . accompanied by a surfeit of
background information. . . . [W]e have permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by
reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, in a case
applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and ‘simple
common sense.’”
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515
U.S. 618, 628 (1995)).

06 - Bambauer.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

3/18/2018 4:51 PM

SNAKE OIL SPEECH

123

contained no saturated fats).216 But the Nutritional Labeling and Education
Act of 1990 required FDA preclearance for these claims, and the
advertising that differentiated between oils and fats dried up as a result.217
Without the ability to make health claims, food producers had little
incentive to swap saturated fats for healthier oils, and sure enough
consumption of saturated fats rose again.218
More recently, false advertising law has interfered with public
education about the dangers of sweeteners. When the sugar and corn
industries settled their false advertising claims against each other, they
ended a negative advertising battle that disputed whether high-fructose
corn syrup was as “healthy” as sugar or not.219 Both industries had viable
claims because each had only weak scientific support; a bench trial could
have gone either way.220 In terms of legal strategy, the settlement was
sound, but the consumers will suffer from it. Sugar and corn were stuck
in a “less bad” advertising campaign.221 The advertisements may have
been inaccurate in the specifics (whether sugar is better than high fructose
corn syrup), but this was secondary to the more illuminating message that
both sweeteners are bad. If the sugar and corn industries had agreed long
ago to refrain from producing advertisements that point out the negative
health effects of the other’s product, the collusion would arouse the
suspicions of antitrust regulators, yet the Lanham Act’s false advertising
provisions steered them to the same result.222
216. Beales III et al., supra note 214, at 89–90.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. E.J. Schultz, Sugar and Corn Industries Settle False Ad Lawsuit, AD AGE (Nov. 20, 2015),
http://adage.com/article/cmo-strategy/sugar-corn-industries-settle-false-ad-lawsuit/301469/
[https://perma.cc/WYN9-KRH3]; Complaint at 2, W. Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
98 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV11-3473 CBM (MANx)).
220. The corn syrup industry’s claim that the sweeteners were equivalent is more consistent with
the evidence (some of which was funded by the corn industry). Kathleen Doheny, How Sugar
Compares with High Fructose Corn Syrup, WEBMD (Oct. 11, 2010), https://www.webmd.com/
diet/news/20101011/how-sugar-compares-with-high-fructose-corn-syrup#1 [https://perma.cc/X8CL
-9DTS]; Is High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) Worse than Sugar?, EXAMINE.COM, https://examine
.com/nutrition/is-hfcs-high-fructose-corn-syrup-worse-than-sugar/ [https://perma.cc/N8H6-XFUD]
(last updated Sept. 21, 2017) (surveying relevant literature); Gary Taubes, Is Sugar Toxic, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/ magazine/mag-17Sugar-t.html [https://
perma.cc/8V5G-DAVU]. However, high-fructose corn syrup does contain a slightly higher
percentage of fructose, the obesity-promoting element. Since juries can determine truth using a
preponderance standard, the corn industry had justified doubts about the outcome. See discussion of
false advertising standards infra section I.E.
221. JOHN E. CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION 46–57 (1997).
222. “Less bad” advertising effects have been documented with cigarette advertising, too, during
the famous tar wars in which the manufacturers claimed to have cigarettes that were less harmful than
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Regulators and the Supreme Court often take it on faith that advertising
always increases demand for the product advertised,223 but this is an
incomplete understanding of the consumer response to advertising. The
more important point is that when reasonable but less-than-fullysubstantiated health claims are screened out of advertising, consumers are
poorly served.
2.

Breeding Overconfidence

The last section focused on the strength of the claims that are screened
out by current law, but the converse is that current law hides the
weaknesses of claims that are condoned by it. By pruning away cheap talk
and poorly supported scientific claims, the government induces reliance
on the claims that do make it to the market. This is, in fact, one of the
purposes of false advertising law. It gives consumers more confidence in
the claims that are made by responsible companies.224 But this confidence
may be misplaced, particularly if the law is too effective in removing
doubt.
Finality and authoritative truth are at odds with the scientific process.225
That is not to say that every claim should be treated as equally credible as
every other—as Part I explained, there are better and worse forms of
substantiation. Still, consumers and experts alike often forget how hard it
is to collect meaningful data about complex social, environmental, and
health problems. Even the most reliable scientific processes will lead
researchers astray. We can get a sense of this just by considering the

competitors. The overwhelming message that consumers got, before the FTC stepped in and
prohibited the health claims, was that cigarettes are dangerous. Id.; see also James L. Hamilton, The
Demand for Cigarettes, 54 REV. ECON. & STAT. 401, 401 (1972) (describing how advertising bans
were counterintuitively harmful because while advertising caused a small increase in consumption,
that effect was swamped by the effects of the health scare from responsive advertising).
223. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 557–58 (2001); Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995). Regulators are also susceptible to biases from serving high moral
purposes that can get in the way of dispassionate analysis. Lee Jussim et al., Can High Moral Purposes
Undermine Scientific Integrity?, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY 173 (Joseph P. Forgas
et al. eds., 2016).
224. David Vinjamuri, POM Wonderful’s Deception Is the Tip of the Iceberg, FORBES (May
23, 2012, 4:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidvinjamuri/2012/05/23/judge-finds-pomwonderful-advertising-deceptive-but-thats-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg/#2f1188421619
[https://perma.cc/LZ5N-UJ58] (“Faced with a barrage of sensational claims relating to everything
from weight loss to impotence, we lose a measure of trust in all brands. This loss of goodwill
effectively becomes a tax born by ethical brands as well as dodgy ones, as gaining consumer trust and
loyalty become more difficult and more expensive for all.”).
225. STUART FIRESTEIN, IGNORANCE: HOW IT DRIVES SCIENCE 22 (2012) (“[t]here are cases where
knowledge, or apparent knowledge, stands in the way of ignorance” and productive exploration).
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generally accepted 5% standard for statistical significance. Statistical
significance usually indicates that the chance that the results would have
occurred by pure randomness is only 5%. But as soon as fifteen different
statistically significant findings are pulled together, the chances are
greater than 50% that at least one finding is random noise. Add to this the
fact that much public health research cannot be replicated when
independent researchers try, and we get a humbling picture. Even when
we make rational, evidence-based decisions, we are fumbling in the dark.
A few sobering examples will get the point across. A recent meta-study
examined the prevalence of medical reversals—events where a current
standard of care used by doctors is found to be ineffective or harmful.226
The meta-study found that out of 363 studies that rigorously retested an
accepted standard of care, 146 (40%) resulted in reversal.227 Only 38% of
the studies validated the standard of care, and the rest were
inconclusive.228 Of course, the medical standards that were selected for
study may not have been representative—they may have been chosen
because there was some doubt in the field about their value—but the
results are chilling nevertheless.
The journal Perspectives on Psychological Science has been producing
a special type of article that it calls a “registered replication report” that
retests a highly influential study in the field.229 So far, only one out of five
retested studies have produced results consistent with the original
study.230 And in 2012, the pharmaceutical company Amgen announced
that it attempted to replicate fifty-three landmark cancer studies and failed
to reproduce the findings for forty-seven of them, despite going to unusual
lengths to contact and work with the original authors.231 And among the
thirty-six cancer drugs approved by the FDA between 2008 and 2012,
226. Vinay Prisad et al., A Decade of Reversal: An Analysis of 146 Contradicted Medical Practices,
88 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 790, 790 (2013).
227. Id. at 792.
228. Id.
229. Registered Replication Reports, ASS’N FOR PSYCHOL. SCI., http://www.psychological
science.org/publications/replication [https://perma.cc/34XU-TD49].
230. The Replication Game: How Well Do Psychology Studies Hold Up?, SCI. FRIDAY (Aug. 5,
2016),
https://www.sciencefriday.com/segments/the-replication-game-how-well-do-psychologystudies-hold-up/ [https://perma.cc/8VDC-V547].
231. Sharon Begley, In Cancer Science, Many “Discoveries” Don’t Hold Up, REUTERS (Mar. 28,
2012, 10:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-science-cancer/in-cancer-science-manydiscoveries-dont-hold-up-idUSBRE82R12P20120328
[https://perma.cc/PD3A-R6U2].
More
recently, Amgen has started to publish data from its failed replication efforts. Monya Baker, Biotech
Giant Publishes Failures to Confirm High-Profile Science, NATURE (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.nature.com/news/biotech-giant-publishes-failures-to-confirm-high-profile-science1.19269 [https://perma.cc/ED3C-6KH3].
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only five have exhibited success in the field. The other thirty-one did not
extend their patients’ survival.232 This means that even the FDA’s high
standards for drug approval, requiring two RCTs, are prone to error.
There are a few explanations for the various replication crises breaking
out in these fields, even when controlled experiments are used as the basis
for knowledge. First, when it comes to clinical drug trials, those in charge
of the trials (drug companies) have a stake in the outcome and are
therefore likely to do a number of things that help improve the odds of
finding efficacy. They may, for example, limit the pool of research
subjects to patients who are relatively young and healthy.233 Or for
pragmatic reasons, they may look for early outcomes that are used as
proxies for improved health—lower cholesterol or smaller tumors—rather
than waiting to see how long-term health is affected.234 So even when an
RCT is well run and well designed, if its real-world implications rely on
a faulty assumption (e.g., that lowering blood cholesterol will cause a
reduction in heart attack risk) it is going to be misleading.
Decision-makers put more weight than they should on FDA approval
processes. Doctors believe drugs are more effective than they really are,235
possibly because the FDA is involved as a gate-keeper. In at least one
sense, the non-experimental observational studies often used in
epidemiology and economics have an advantage over experimental
evidence: their flaws are so well known and so often pointed out that
nobody puts much faith in a single study. As Rogert Peng put it, “[i]t’s
difficult to have a replication crisis when nobody believes the findings in
the first place.”236
None of these issues seriously compromises the high status of RCTs.
RCT experiments should be treated as a weighty form of evidence,
particularly when they use a representative sample of subjects and directly

232. Chul Kim & Vinay Prasad, Research Letter, Cancer Drugs Approved on the Basis of a
Surrogate End Point and Subsequent Overall Survival: An Analysis of Five Years of US Food and
Drug Administration Approvals, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1992, 1992–94 (2015).
233. See Keith Humphreys et al., Subject Eligibility Criteria Can Substantially Influence the
Results of Alcohol-Treatment Outcome Research, 69 J. STUD. ALCOHOL & DRUGS 757, 757 (2008).
Note that academic researchers are also likely to want positive results rather than null results because
their measure of success (publication) is also dependent on significant findings.
234. Kim & Prasad, supra note 232, at 1992–94.
235. Tammy C. Hoffman & Chris Del Mar, Clinicians’ Expectations of the Benefits and Harms of
Treatments, Screening, and Tests, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 407, 407 (2017).
236. Roger Peng, A Simple Explanation for the Replication Crisis in Science, SIMPLY STAT. (Aug.
24, 2016), https://simplystatistics.org/2016/08/24/replication-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/AE5H-HNJ4].
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measure the outcome of interest.237 But they should not be mistaken for
truth.
Overconfidence in RCTs and other standards maintained by regulators
does not necessarily cause trouble in the short term. At any given moment,
a consumer decision made on the basis of those standards is probably the
best choice. But the standards can cause frustration and backlash if the
government suggests that the scientific evidence creates a solid ground
when it is more like shifting sands. Consumers are exasperated by health
and nutrition trends that rise and fall too quickly. When the government
oversells the science behind health and nutritional claims in order to urge
consumers to make decisions that are rational in the present, it undermines
the chances that consumers will make updated, rational decisions in the
future.
The long-term solution is for Americans to become more scienceliterate, to accept epistemic uncertainty, and to optimize their choices
under those conditions. Financial regulators are starting to move in that
direction. After decades of regulatory responses that ratcheted up the
duties imposed on information intermediaries like accountants and credit
agencies, the SEC is now considering opportunities to reduce reliance on
credit-ratings agencies to bring back more consumer skepticism.238 But
this is an unusual trend. In most areas of law, false advertising regulation
leaves no room for ambiguity. Ads are either false or, presumptively, true.
3.

Thwarting Salience and Dynamism

Advertising law must balance two important goals that work at crosspurposes: developing consumer trust in a message, and developing
consumer appetite for more evidence.
Advertising claims are helpful in part because they are taken at face
value. If an audience had to go find all the underlying facts and develop
the analytical skills to form his or her own opinion about the validity of a
claim, advertising wouldn’t provide any informational efficiencies.239 On
237. RCTs may also be more risky than necessary. An alternative to randomizing is to assign the
treatment until there is a failure, and then assign the control until there is a failure, and back and forth.
This “one-armed bandit” method of testing will distribute the treatment in proportion to its efficacy
(relative to the control). See BRIAN CHRISTIAN & TOM GRIFFITHS, ALGORITHMS TO LIVE BY: THE
COMPUTER SCIENCE OF HUMAN DECISIONS 45–52 (2016). Machine learning may eventually bring a
paradigm shift to the fields that currently rely on RCTs. With machine learning, experiments are
initially designed using observational data (training data) and constantly altered and tweaked based
on ongoing outcomes.
238. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the Essence of Duty, 60 AM. U. L.
REV. 59, 62 (2011).
239. Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 B.U. L. REV. 43, 77 (2011).
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the other hand, advertising is part of a dynamic process, often with
multiple points of decision-making. Access to weak science at T0 can
generate demand for better evidence at T1.240 As Julie Cohen has said,
“exposure to information shapes demand for additional information.”241
False advertising law can interfere with evidence-based decisionmaking and with the incentives to produce that evidence base. For
example, a doctor, who was also the CEO of a drug company, was
convicted of fraud for enthusiastically promoting the results of a study of
the company’s drug for treatment of a deadly disease, IPF.242 Although
the study was published in the prestigious New England Journal of
Medicine, the government successfully argued that the study design was
flawed by choosing a subset of research subjects after data had been
collected and analyzed.243 On retesting, the drug performed no better than
placebo and caused mild side effects.244 But given that there are no known
effective treatments for IPF,245 the promotion of a potentially promising
treatment was arguably better than silence. It stimulated demand for more
testing and caused relatively little harm in the interim.
In a case with lower stakes, a court barred Clorox’s advertising that
claimed its kitty litter eliminates odors better than baking-soda-based kitty
litters. Clorox had tested the effects on odor based on cat waste that had
spent twenty-two to twenty-six hours sealed in jars, but the court thought
this experiment did not substantiate Clorox’s claims because cat litter is
usually left in the open air, rather than sealed in jars.246 The legal

240. Many scholars have made this point in the broader context of speech if not the specific context
of advertising. Norton, Lies and the Constitution, supra note 5, at 165 (“[L]ies that trigger
confrontation and rebuttal may lead to increased public awareness and understanding of the truth.”);
Spottswood, supra note 21, at 1238 (“Erroneous speech as a Means of Increasing Our Evidence.”);
Jonathan Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious
Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1119 (2006).
241. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1818 (2000).
242. United States v. Harkonen, No. CR08-0164MHP, 2009 WL 5166246, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
15, 2009).
243. United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633, 636 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Patti Zettler, U.S.
v. Harkonen: Should Scientists Worry About Being Prosecuted for How They Interpret Their Research
Results?, STAN. L. SCH.: L. & BIOSCIENCES BLOG (Oct. 7, 2013), https://law.stanford.edu/2013/10/
07/lawandbiosciences-2013-10-07-u-s-v-harkonen-should-scientists-worry-about-being-prosecutedfor-how-they-interpret-their-research-results/ [https://perma.cc/ZPG3-3FKE].
244. Talmadge E. King Jr. et al., Effect of Interferon Gamma-1b on Survival in Patients with
Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis (INSPIRE): A Multicentre, Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Trial,
374 LANCET 222, 222 (2009).
245. See Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis, NAT’L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST.,
https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/ipf/treatment [https://perma.cc/KCZ4-NNR5].
246. Church & Dwight Co. v. Clorox Co., 840 F. Supp. 2d 717, 721–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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intervention made the perfect the enemy of the good and reduced
incentives to design advertising campaigns around product testing.
This is not to say that advertising is a great source for scientific
education. The charts, graphs, and technical-looking mumbo-jumbo used
in commercials are often silly and meaningless. It’s easy to get cynical
about the types of evidence that consumers find convincing. Commercials
too often have only the veneer of science without the methodological
soundness. But the steady increase in scientific claims over the last
century, including pseudoscientific claims, show something hopeful:
consumers want to make decisions on the basis of evidence. They want to
see that one diaper holds more blue liquid than another without leaking,
or that four dentists out of five recommend their toothpaste. It is easy to
overlook how much progress the human population has made. Not long
ago even well-educated consumers did not understand the value of an
experiment and empirical evidence.247
Less well-supported scientific claims, even those that verge on the
pseudoscientific, have the virtue of focusing consumer attention on the
product attributes that they should value most when making their
purchasing decision—health, efficacy, and safety. When these claims are
reduced by regulation, they are not necessarily replaced by bettersubstantiated claims. Consumers will not consult PubMed when health
claims are purged from advertisements. Instead, advertising will focus on
legally immune puffery, on vague concepts like “smooth” and “manly” in
the 1960s or “green” and “natural” today.248 Advertisers will make
imprecise health claims because precision is a liability.249 And they will
make claims that are easier to support empirically, even if those attributes
do not deserve the same salience as health, efficacy, and safety.250
For these reasons—because good information is screened out, because
substantiated information is given too much weight, and because
censorship can reduce salience of the important attributes—factual claims

247. For example, in the Middle Ages, an unusually enlightened noble tried to show others that
torture would always extract a confession by killing his own ox and then torturing a farm hand to
confession. But the meaning of the experiment was lost on his peers. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER
ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 140 (2011).
248. See CALFEE, supra note 221, at 51.
249. Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995); Phantom Touring, Inc. v.
Affiliated Publ’ns, 953 F.2d 724, 728 n.7 (1st Cir. 1992) (claim was “subjective and imprecise, and
therefore not capable of verification or refutation by means of objective proof”).
250. Moreover, the claims that can be substantiated can cause the product to enjoy an undeserved
“halo effect,” where consumers infer that if a product is good for them in one way, it is better for them
in other ways, too. Brian Roe et al., The Impact of Health Claims on Consumer Search and Product
Evaluation Outcomes: Results from FDA Experimental Data, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 89, 99
(1999).
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made in commercial speech that are neither very likely to be true nor very
likely to be false should be given some intermediate free speech
protection.
The problems discussed here do not suggest that the law of false
advertising should be scrapped or significantly rewritten. Advertisers can
create a lot of havoc using influential contested claims. But as Part IV will
explain, regulators should be steered by the First Amendment to design
their restrictions around risk rather than truth.
B.

Truth and the Public Discourse Free-For-All

If the First Amendment does too little to protect the claims made by
commercial speakers, it does too much to shield the claims made in mass
media.
For example, a study of eighty randomly selected medical
recommendations that were made on the hit TV show, Dr. Oz, found that
less than half had any evidence base whatsoever, even a single case
study.251 Fifteen percent of the recommendations contradicted the existing
evidence base, meaning that the show broadcasts not just contested claims
but anti-knowledge.252 (Recommendations from The Doctors were
slightly better supported.253) The website Natural News is similarly
flawed (if less influential). Natural News claimed that the Zika virus is a
conspiracy made up by the pharmaceutical industry, and that the Zikarelated birth defects are actually caused by exposure to mosquito
repellants and insecticides.254 To the extent these reports steer their
audiences to take action that they would not otherwise take, and to the
extent those actions make the audience worse off, these public statements
create foreseeable and unnecessary risks.
Courts have shied away from legal interventions that would repress or
punish these types of scientific debates, even when some statements are
251. Christina Korownyk et al., Televised Medical Talk Shows—What They Recommend and the
Evidence to Support Their Recommendations: A Prospective Observational Study, BMJ, Dec. 17,
2014, at 1.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Mike Adams, Ten Shocking Reasons Why Zika Virus Fear Is Another Fraudulent Medical
Hoax and Vaccine Industry Funding Scam, NAT. NEWS (June 3, 2016),
https://www.naturalnews.com/054248_Zika_virus_medical_hoax_vaccine_industry.html
[https://perma.cc/5S7C-GJTC]. The article refers to the author, Mike Adams, as “the Health Ranger.”
Id. A study of Facebook posts about the Zika virus found that misinformation about Zika was more
prevalent than accurate information. Megha Sharma et al., Zika Virus Pandemic—Analysis of
Facebook as a Social Media Health Information Platform, 45 AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL 301–02
(2017).
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highly likely to be false, because of commitments to open discourse.255
But, as the law of fraud, defamation, privacy, right of publicity, and even
incitement illustrate, the constitutional right to free speech will bend when
there is a credible threat to the audience or the subject of the speech.
Fraud, incitement, and defamation have the advantage of being historical
and traditional exceptions to the scope of First Amendment coverage—an
attribute that has great influence over whether the government will prevail
in a free speech challenge.256 Privacy and the right of publicity, however,
are not among the historically recognized exceptions and have
nevertheless survived judicial scrutiny, albeit sometimes in pared-down
form.257
These areas of law have withstood constitutional challenge because
courts have a mental model of how listeners will interpret and react to
speech, and what harms will flow from those reactions. That same model
should support a narrow set of restrictions on scientific and health claims
in the popular press—particularly where the statements are forcefully
contradicted by a strong body of evidence and are likely to result in
harmful conduct by the audience. Restrictions of this sort do not rely on
falsity alone. (After all, privacy and right of publicity claims do not
involve falsehoods.) Rather, restrictions on dangerous scientific claims
can be justified because of risk.
The next Part shows how First Amendment law can be reshaped to
bend for risk rather than falsity and what implications this shift will have.
IV. PROTECTION TOMORROW
First Amendment law is in the process of correcting the misstep of
using a true/false dichotomy for factual claims. As a category, factual
claims share the quality that they are capable of being proven or
disproven. But only a subset of them are presently capable of validation.
The rest are caught up in a free speech paradox, simultaneously
condemned for being possibly false (and of “low value”) and endorsed for
being possibly true.258
255. And the mantra that “there is no such thing as a false idea.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
256. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010).
257. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011) (striking down a law prohibiting the sale
of health data but assuring that narrower privacy laws would survive scrutiny); Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (finding that a tort claim based on the right of publicity
survives a First Amendment challenge).
258. This is most famously and beautifully captured in Justice Holmes’s dissenting opinion in
Abrams v. United States. “Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
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The judiciary is beginning to recognize the limits of the true/false
dichotomy. As the Second Circuit observed,
[I]t is the very premise of the scientific enterprise that it engages
with empirically verifiable facts about the universe. At the same
time, however, it is the essence of the scientific method that the
conclusions of empirical research are tentative and subject to
revision, because they represent inferences about the nature of
reality based on the results of experimentation and observation.259
The best way to preserve what is working in the truth-oriented case law
while fixing what is not is to shift from falsity to risk as the basis for
regulation. Falsity and risk are often in sync—in many contexts, they rise
and fall together. Their close relationship helps preserve the benefits of
our current system in the commercial speech realm while opening up
some routes for the reasonable regulation of public discourse. But where
they tack apart, the falsity orientation gets in the way of free speech
without sufficient justification.
This Part describes a risk-centered approach, and illustrates how it
would affect current law.
A.

The Harm-Centered Approach to Factual Claims

If the First Amendment protection of factual claims centered around
risk, it would distinguish between two categories of unverified factual
claims that are currently treated as one: contested claims (for which no
solid base of evidence exists to validate or refute the claim), and antiknowledge (which is contradicted by a solid base of evidence). Contested
knowledge is speculation and debate, while anti-knowledge is the set of
factual claims that can be verified, to a reasonable extent, as false.
1.

Anti-Knowledge

Anti-knowledge from a commercial speaker serves little public value,
and the precedents that restrict false claims from the scope of First
Amendment protection require no overhaul. Commercial speakers will
not contribute meaningfully to consumer education when their claims are
exceedingly likely to misinform their audience.

logical. . . . But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . .” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
259. ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 2013).
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More controversially, the government should also be permitted to
regulate anti-knowledge within the public discourse so long as the claim
is likely to cause the listeners to take action that puts themselves or others
in serious risk of harm, and the speaker has a sufficiently culpable mental
state.260 No modern case law suggests that the caution used in Winter v.
G.P. Putnam’s Sons is constitutionally required.261 When a speaker
recklessly provides misinformation that is likely to cause foreseeable risk
of even physical harm, legal redress should be able to withstand free
speech scrutiny. The state action could not cover claims that make clear,
in context, that the speaker is taking an outlier position on the topic.262 A
responsible regime could also develop a notice system whereby a speaker
responsible for a dangerously false claim is given adequate time to correct
or remove the claim before liability or other consequences attach.
2.

Contested Knowledge

Contested knowledge that is not currently capable of being verified
with strong evidence is a different matter. Whether contested claims are
made by commercial or public speakers, these claims should be covered
by the First Amendment and afforded some amount of protection. They
cannot be treated as presumptively false without overstretching the
meaning of the word and without abandoning the theory that free speech
provides a robust market for competing claims to vie for acceptance.
But just because an unverified factual claim isn’t “false” doesn’t mean
it is automatically immunized from regulation. So under what conditions
would regulators have sufficient justification to restrict an unverifiable
claim?
A wholly utilitarian model for screening factual claims would compare
the risks of censorship to the risks of speech. A formula would look like
this:
260. Precedents across a broad spectrum of speech restrictions consistently require a heightened
mental state before a speaker can be punished. Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2001,
2009–11 (2015); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). By comparing the mental state requirements of
defamation required for public and private figures, I assume that the higher “malice” mental state
would be required for a claim against dangerous anti-knowledge because of the ample opportunity
for counter-speech.
261. The reasoning of Alvarez suggests the opposite. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 724
(2012) (suggesting that laws might survive First Amendment strict scrutiny if there is “a direct causal
link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented”).
262. For example, when Natural News publishes stories claiming that the Centers for Disease
Control is deceitful, the claim itself announces that the publisher is taking a position that contradicts
the standard authorities (including the CDC).
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Risk of Claim C =
[(Estimated Losses if C is false) x (Probability that C is false)] [(Estimated Benefits if C is true) x (Probability that C is true)]
This formula is somewhat simplified because it does not account for
the incentives or disincentives to conduct more research, but given the
difficulty of estimating each of these variables it is complex enough.263
For contested claims that are part of a public discussion, the
constitution requires a heaping serving of doubt that the government has
the competence or motivation to estimate losses, benefits, and
probabilities in a dispassionate way. Thus, factual claims that are
presently unverifiable must be fully protected in the public discourse.
Indeed, the public sphere is where battles over the better interpretation of
the available evidence should be hashed out.
But free speech law need not be as skeptical about the competence and
motivation of the government with respect to commercial speakers. First
Amendment doctrine continues to make allowances for the efficient
regulation of marketplace actors by applying the lower, Central Hudson
form of scrutiny. This should allow regulators to restrict unverified claims
in the commercial sphere if the estimated risks outweigh the estimated
benefits.
The risk analysis is clearly influenced by the level of substantiation a
claim has. If a claim is baseless or close to it, then the probability that the
claim is false will typically be high, and even a small loss can suffice to
justify regulation. But where the evidence is stronger, much will depend
on whether the commercial claim induces a benign gamble or a dangerous
one. In fact, it is the benefits and losses that should often drive the
outcome, and those estimates are made not from expertise about the
support for a particular claim but from expertise on consumption patterns
and substitutions.
To illustrate, consider the health claims made by POM Wonderful. One
of the advertisements that caught the attention of the FTC claimed that
drinking pomegranate juice could reduce the chance of heart disease.264
The FTC’s case against POM was concerned solely with the assessment
of probability of truth—the quality of the substantiating evidence. But
let’s set that aside for a moment and ask what the consequences to
consumers would be under both the condition that the claim is true and
that it’s false. If the claim is true, the increase in pomegranate
263. The formula is also consistent with the FTC’s original understanding of its enforcement
authority under the “unfairness” prong of the FTC Act as described in the “Pfizer factors.” See In re
Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972); Randal Shaheen & Amy R. Mudge, Has the FTC Changed the Game
on Advertising Substantiation?, 25 CONSUMER PROT. DEV. 65, 65 (2010).
264. POM Figures Appendix (Appendix B), supra note 153, at fig.12.
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consumption should be beneficial. If the claim is false, the increase in
pomegranate consumption probably has negligible health effects. If the
marginal consumer who buys POM because of the advertising campaign
is substituting pomegranate juice for a quinoa and kale salad, their heart
health will probably suffer, but the more likely scenario is that the
marginal consumer substituted pomegranate juice for orange juice or even
soda. The health effect is a wash.265 It is a benign gamble.
There are non-health losses of course—perhaps the consumer would
have preferred the taste of a different beverage, or would have paid less
for it. If POM’s statements were anti-knowledge, or so devoid of support
that the chance of being false is high, these types of losses would tip the
scales toward regulation. But the links between pomegranates,
antioxidants, and heart health are established well enough to differentiate
this from a quasi-fraud style of claim. The losses and benefits should be
measured in terms of the consequences to health—the attribute that was
decisive for the marginal purchaser.
On the other hand, a re-analysis of the Caronia case (involving the offlabel promotion of a drug) is likely to come out in favor of the FDA.
Caronia was advocating use of the drug Xyrem for off-label purposes
including for relatively minor diseases like restless leg syndrome.266 The
basis for assessing the probability that Xyrem was effective for the offlabel uses was mixed—for some uses, the evidence consisted merely of
reported uses by other doctors,267 while for other uses, clinical trials
proved the efficacy.268 However, the drug Xyrem causes a number of side
effects, including nausea, depression, and pain in a substantial number of
patients.269 While the doctors who heard Caronia’s pitch would have
understood that the recommendation was off-label and therefore was
probably not supported by a surfeit of evidence, the risk to patients may
outweigh the benefits of the information exchange if (and this is a big “if”)
the involvement of physicians cannot provide sufficient protection.

265. Perhaps we could imagine a particularly impressionable consumer who drinks POM
Wonderful in lieu of exercising and taking his heart medication. I doubt any consumer would put this
much stock in an advertising campaign, but even if one did, this type of absurd substitution would be
harmful even if the POM Wonderful advertising was true and strongly substantiated.
266. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2012).
267. Id. at 156–57.
268. Todd J. Swick, Sodium Oxybate: A Potential New Pharmacological Option for the Treatment
of Fibromyalgia Syndrome, 3 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES MUSCULOSKELETAL DISEASE 167, 167
(2011); Matt McMillen, FDA Panel Rejects Xyrem as Fibromyalgia Treatment, WEBMD (Aug. 20,
2010), https://www.webmd.com/fibromyalgia/news/20100820/fda-panel-rejects-xyrem-as-fibromy
algia-treatment#1 [https://perma.cc/43LR-3GRK].
269. Xyrem Side Effects, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/sfx/xyrem-side-effects.html
[https://perma.cc/866F-UVV2] (nausea (up to 20%), depression (1–10%), and pain (1–10%)).
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If there is a difference in the outcome of an analysis between Xyrem
and pomegranate juice, it has much more to do with the relative safety
profiles of the two substances than it does the relative efficacy profiles.
At a greater level of generality, it might be safe to say that a utilitarian
approach would allow contested claims about foods but disallow them
about drugs. In the short term, except in the case of allergies, foods
consumed in standard quantities do not cause risks, while drugs consumed
in standard dosages often do.
This raises the issue of pragmatism. Although the utility analysis would
ideally apply claim by claim, resource constraints may require regulators
to make broad categories of claims that are more or less likely to cause
harm without making fine-grain distinctions within those categories.
Thus, at least at this time, it may be constitutionally sufficient to justify
speech restrictions on drugs categorically, even if no categorical
explanation could be offered for restrictions on food claims.
Nothing in the recommendations here remove the practical deference
that courts have historically given to expert agencies like the FDA.270
Although in time the courts will probably need to increase their
competence and do independent constitutional fact-finding in order to
ensure the protection of individual rights,271 I expect in the medium term
the courts will value and largely follow the scientific assessments of
agencies with respect to risk, just as they have for truth. However,
whatever deference is paid to agencies, the recommendations here mark
an important change in the substance of the law for factual claims.
Lawmakers and expert agencies must make their regulatory decisions on
the basis of harm and risk, rather than truth, and they must be prepared to
defend them on that basis, too. This will require a shift in current agency
practices, as the next subsection will explain.
B.

Implications for Contested Knowledge in Commercial Claims

Contested knowledge creates First Amendment heartburn because it is
a widely varying category. It includes claims that fall just shy of the
relevant standards for accepted knowledge as well as claims that have
only anecdotal evidence. Today’s false advertising law is largely
explained by a fear that without intervention, the marketplace would be
saturated with advertising that encourages magical thinking.
For both cynical and optimistic reasons, I believe these fears are
unfounded. The cynical explanation is that advertising is already
270. See All. for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 57 (D.D.C. 2010).
271. See Justin Sevier, Redesigning the Science Court, 73 MD. L. REV. 770, 775–76 (2014)
(describing the crisis in expert evidentiary fact-finding and some proposals to correct it).
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brimming with incredible and misleading claims that take advantage of
shoppers’ hopes, fears, and ignorance that evade regulatory control.
Claims that a product is “non-GMO,” “natural,” or “local,” for example,
can avoid regulation by being technically true even if they are less safe,
worse for the environment, and cost more.272 And yet (and here’s the
optimistic explanation), consumers greatly discount cheap talk and
navigate their options in a way that is mostly consistent with their personal
philosophies and preferences.273 Thus, the stakes are not as high as they
appear.
Contested knowledge will create the most trouble for tradeoff
products—things that expose consumers to some risks that may be
outweighed, at least for some consumers, by the benefits. Sugar cereals,
for example, are unhealthy, but parents well-educated about the
drawbacks of sugar may rationally decide to buy and treat their kids to
them. E-cigarettes are another good example. E-cigarettes are associated
with some heightened risks of depression and lung disease, but they are
vastly superior to cigarettes when it comes to safety.274 So the risk analysis
depends very much on who the consumer is. If the consumer is a nonsmoker, the risk is moderately high. If the consumer is a current smoker,
the risk is negative and very large. The FDA currently restricts the
promotion of e-cigarettes in order to avoid enticing nonsmokers to use ecigarettes. But the net effect on public health from e-cigarette promotion
would probably be positive.275 Thus, unless the FDA generates better

272. E.g., Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not
Been Derived from Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 2015),
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/ucm05
9098.htm [https://perma.cc/FD86-QXLA] (explaining that the FDA is not aware of any safety
concerns related to genetically modified foods, but providing guidance for labeling foods as “not
genetically modified” anyway in order to meet consumer demand).
273. Individuals spend more time and effort acquiring information about the things they buy than
who to support in their local and national elections because they intuitively know that the effort spent
deciding which television to buy will make a difference in the outcome while the effort spent on
selecting a candidate will not. See CALFEE, supra note 221, at 37–42 (describing evidence of
consumer skepticism); BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES
CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 14 (2007); Ilya Somin, Foot Voting vs. Ballot Box Voting, BALKINIZATION
(Oct. 7, 2013), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/10/foot-voting-vs-ballot-box-voting.html [https://
perma.cc/TYM6-3CPQ] (“That doesn’t mean that foot voters are always well-informed or perfectly
unbiased in their evaluation of information. Far from it. But, on average, they do a much better job
than ballot box voters do.”).
274. ROYAL COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, NICOTINE WITHOUT SMOKE: TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION
189–90 (2016).
275. Jonathan Adler et al., Baptists, Bootleggers & Electronic Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. REG. 313,
348–49, 361 (2016).
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evidence about the marginal effects of advertising, the current regulations
should fail under intermediate scrutiny.
But the FDA has resisted reform to use risk as the basis for advertising
restrictions. In fact, in a recent memo that addresses the First Amendment
implications for off-label promotion, the FDA rejected the suggestion that
regulatory controls vary based on the safety profile of the drug. According
to the memo, risk-oriented regulations “would be inadequate by
themselves to protect the public safety because the required safety
assessment depends on the generation of data regarding product dangers
before any controls can be applied” and “the acceptability of product risks
can only be properly evaluated in the context of robust data about the
efficacy of the product.”276
This is a sort of risk-based defense of the current law. The FDA is
essentially arguing that without more testing, the default assumption for
drugs is that they are too dangerous. This is a plausible position for
unapproved drugs, but it is a peculiar position with respect to off-label
promotion of drugs. Drugs that have already been approved for one
medical purpose have a history of clinical trials and field experience that
can inform a safety assessment. Approved drugs with serious side effects
and contraindications could therefore require more testing, perhaps even
the currently required approval process for labeling, in order to ensure the
risks are outweighed by efficacy for the new purpose. But for approved
drugs with only mild or rare side effects, the FDA should be able to
tolerate a lower standard for the evidence of efficacy.
The FDA might be implicitly arguing that drugs, as a class, are a
product that involve great risk of danger to patients, and therefore the
promotion for any particular purpose requires iron-clad proof of efficacy
for not only the first approved use, but all additional uses of the drug. But
three things cast doubt on this logic. First, doctors can and do prescribe
drugs off-label without strong evidence of efficacy. 277 If off-label
prescribing were dangerous without premarket testing, the off-label
prescribing should be just as troublesome as off-label promotion. Second,
many drugs, including virtually all over-the-counter drugs, have a wellestablished track record of causing very few or only mild side effects.278

276. FDA, PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 135, at 28.
277. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012).
278. Drugs can be approved for over-the-counter use only through a special FDA application
process with heightened standards for safety or only after the drug has proven over time to be
“generally recognized as safe and effective (GRASE).” See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
REGULATION OF NONPRESCRIPTION DRUG PRODUCTS, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/UCM148055.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
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And third, relatedly, the category of products that are treated as “drugs”
is defined (at least in part) by the products’ benefits rather than their risks.
Any substance that is promoted to diagnose, treat, or cure a disease is
classified as a drug no matter how safe it may be.279
The FDA Act definitions of drugs, food, and dietary supplements are
not well-matched to a risk-oriented approach to speech restrictions.
Producers of foods and supplements with well-known medicinal
properties and strong safety records, such as some mushroom
supplements,280 must refrain from educating the consumer about their
potential to treat or prevent a disease because otherwise the product will
be reclassified as a drug and have to undergo clinical trials. Where there
is no opportunity to patent the product or maintain exclusive control in
some other way, clinical trials will be prohibitively expensive.
Meanwhile, a manufacturer that aggressively promotes its product using
general health and wellness claims or using any other enticement is under
no obligation whatsoever to prove the safety of its product even though
many supplements have known, serious side effects.281 The current rules,
therefore, will be hard for the FDA to defend unless the definitions of
“foods” and “drugs” are altered to differentiate based on safety rather than
efficacy.282
Another justification for the current apparatus of FDA drug approval is
to create incentives for manufacturers to create more high-value studies.283
The theory that this will work for any off-patent product is dubious.284 The

Z9DU-FHBK]; GRASE, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/
training/OTC/topic3/topic3/da_01_03_0040.htm [https://perma.cc/2EDR-HSLK].
279. Id.
280. See generally Solomon P. Wasser, Medical Mushroom Science: Current Perspectives,
Advances, Evidences, and Challenges, 37 BIOMED J. 345 (2014).
281. Dietary supplements can make health claims about reducing risks of specific diseases without
triggering the requirements for drug testing. FDA 101: Dietary Supplements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm050803.htm [https://perma.cc/
HYD2-UJD3] (last updated July 15, 2015). They are treated as special types of food. FDA Regulation
of Drugs Versus Dietary Supplements, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/treatment/
treatments-and-side-effects/complementary-and-alternative-medicine/dietary-supplements/fdaregulations.html [https://perma.cc/B4W8-M9GN] (last updated Mar. 31, 2015).
282. With this type of adjustment, sugar and alcohol may be better categorized as “drugs.” GARY
TAUBES, THE CASE AGAINST SUGAR 31 (2016).
283. This was one of the FDA’s arguments in the Amarin case. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Greene & Noah, supra note 21,
at 255–56.
284. Also, the companies that can afford to do the research create studies of questionable value
anyway, since even the integrity of studies that may seem methodologically sound can be tangled up
with the purse strings.
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interest in both public safety and the production of research can be served
using the following, more direct alternatives to speech restrictions:
Increased support for research. The government could fund more
independent research on the efficacy and safety of products, and it could
offer rewards for the discovery of unknown benefits and risks. It could
also alleviate some of the burdens of formal research by simplifying
informed consent and Institutional Review Board rules.
Ex post liability and safe harbors. The government could facilitate
post-market liability or fines when a product causes harm and could offer
safe harbor from liability if the product has gone through high-quality premarket testing.
Increased consumer information collection. The government can
incentivize the tracking, in de-identified form, of consumer information
in order to facilitate post-market observational studies. It could also
require companies and doctors to report adverse events. Monitoring would
be especially feasible for medical devices and drugs that require a doctor’s
approval.285
Seals of approval. Government agencies can use their own influential
voices by offering seals of approval or certifications to products that
undergo a high level of safety and efficacy testing.
Sin taxes and health subsidies. Governments can impose taxes on
dangerous products roughly proportional to the cost of the “internality.”286
By driving up prices artificially, the government can ensure that the
market price exceeds the reserve prices for consumers who do not receive
sufficient value from the product. Sin taxes have had greater success than
advertising limitations in curbing the consumption of tobacco and junk
food.287 Similarly, subsidies for healthy products can more effectively
influence consumption decisions, too.288

285. Eric Topol has proposed a probationary status for new devices so that they can be introduced
to the market while sending comprehensive data to health regulators. Brian Buntz, Dr. Eric Topol on
IBM’s Watson, Twitter, and the “Medical Cocoon,” MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY (Apr.
25, 2012), https://www.mddionline.com/dr-eric-topol-ibms-watson-twitter-and-medical-cocoon
[https://perma.cc/9DP5-EDUL].
286. Saul Levmore, Internality Regulation Through Public Choice, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
447, 448–49 (2014).
287. See Pearl Bader et al., Effects of Tobacco Taxation and Pricing on Smoking Behavior in High
Risk Populations: A Knowledge Synthesis, 8 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 4118, 4130–31
(2011).
288. See generally Ruopeng An et al., Eating Better for Less: A National Discount Program for
Healthy Food Purchases in South Africa, 37 AM. J. HEALTH BEHAV. 56 (2013).
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Compelled disclosures. The government can require advertisers to
make substantiating and contradicting evidence available on their
websites.
Product removals. Finally, while extreme, there may be some classes
of products that simply shouldn’t be sold based on its current popular
usage. Raw milk, for example, makes up less than 1% of the milk market
but accounts for over 60% of the milk-related infectious disease.289 This
product may not offer value above pasteurized milk that can justify its
lower safety profile.
The FDA, the FTC, and false advertising law use advertising
restrictions as a means of product and safety regulation. False advertising
law is the paradigmatic example of a truth-oriented regime that would
have to change to develop new elements in order to support a state interest
in reducing risk. As for the expert agencies, it may very well be the case
that the elaborate set of FTC and FDA rules are a reasonably efficient way
to reduce public safety risks. This possibility cannot be ruled out, given
that the courts applying constitutional scrutiny have not, until recently,
demanded a risk-based accounting of the advertising restrictions. But
neither agency has done the introspection and evidence-gathering to
defend its rules on the basis of risk. They have relied on falsity as its
proxy.
CONCLUSION
In the era of “alternative facts” and “fake news,” it will be tempting for
courts to tighten their grip on the truth orientation of factual claims. Many
public intellectuals are understandably concerned that the public cannot
agree on a basic body of facts from which to make reasoned arguments.
They recommend trust in expert and scientific institutions through slogans
like “science is not just a matter of opinion”290 or “science is not a liberal
conspiracy”291 in the hopes of restoring a shared understanding of the
evidence. While a greater aptitude for critical thinking and for sober

289. Bill Marler, Comparing the Food Safety Record of Pasteurized and Raw Milk Products—Part
3, MARLER BLOG (Oct. 10, 2009), http://www.marlerblog.com/lawyer-oped/comparing-the-foodsafety-record-of-pasteurized-and-raw-milk-products-part-3/
[https://perma.cc/6PDT-ZBTC]
(analyzing CDC data; I include queso fresco among the non-pasteurized milk products); see also
Elisabeth A. Mungai et al., Increased Outbreaks Associated with Nonpasteurized Milk, United States,
2007–2012, 21 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 119 (2015).
290. Allen J. Frances, Science Is Not Just a Matter of Opinion, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/saving-normal/201612/science-is-not-just-matter-opinion
[https://perma.cc/VE97-45H8].
291. T-shirts available on Amazon, at https://www.amazon.com/Science-Not-Liberal-ConspiracyT-Shirt/dp/B01LK594SW [https://perma.cc/89YM-AF2U].
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analysis of evidence would certainly improve society, I do not think that
this is the time to be sloppy about what “science” and “facts” are, and the
ambiguity that haunts them.
In a perfectly transparent world, all facts would be described with
confidence intervals and a reference to the relevant supporting and
contradicting evidence. Rather than saying that flying saucers do not exist,
we would explain the basis of our conclusion the way Richard Feynman
did to a UFO enthusiast he met on a plane. To defend his belief that UFOs
are not real, Feynman said, “I mean that from my knowledge of the world
that I see around me, I think that it is much more likely that the reports of
flying saucers are the results of the known irrational characteristics of
terrestrial intelligence than of the unknown rational efforts of extraterrestrial intelligence.”292
Unfortunately, humans cannot communicate this way in very many
contexts. So the law must make allowances for the imprecision and
diverse convictions of speakers, as well as the skepticism or the credulity
of audiences. This is no easy task, but an earnest attempt to link speech
restrictions to risk will improve many of the more chaotic areas of speech
regulation today.
With this adjustment, commercial speech will contain more contested
factual claims. What is lost in terms of technical substantiation will be
made up with increased consumer focus and greater incentive for research
on product attributes that are testable. In the public discourse, on the other
hand, the First Amendment should tolerate more (rather than less)
regulation, at least when a speaker knows that a claim is contradicted by
the accepted knowledge and when the claim is likely to cause harm to the
audience or third parties.
The system proposed in this Article is not foolproof. It relies on human
judgment to categorize factual claims into contested knowledge, accepted
knowledge, and anti-knowledge. For commercial speech, it requires
additional consideration about contested claims to assess whether they
encourage dangerous or benign gambles based on supporting evidence
and predicted effects. The regulators who make these determinations will
not make them perfectly. There will be error, and the decision-maker will
be biased by his own prior beliefs.293 As Bertrand Russell wrote, “[e]very
man, wherever he goes, is encompassed by a cloud of comforting
convictions, which move with him like flies on a summer day.”294 But the
292. RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, THE CHARACTER OF PHYSICAL LAW 166 (1965).
293. This does, however, sidestep the objection that courts are less qualified to make factual
determinations of scientific fact by forcing courts only to ensure that the government actor has done
an analysis, and has done it without any obvious defects.
294. BERTRAND RUSSELL, SCEPTICAL ESSAYS 16 (Routledge 2004) (1928).
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exercise of making and justifying the categorization can screen out some
of the flies. As long as the categorization is done reasonably well, this
system provides a more honest accounting of the state of knowledge than
our current set of free speech rules.
First Amendment law can transition to a risk-oriented approach to
factual claims without creating an existential threat to the regulatory state.
A “gentle tug” will put the law of factual claims on a trajectory that can
be sustained in the long term.295

295. Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991) (referring to the “gentle
tug of the First Amendment”).

